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A B S T R A C T  
The current literature has conceptualized democratization as a linear process of 
structural transformation whereby a state transitions from a repressive regime to a 
democracy. This thesis asserts that democratization cannot be reduced to a process of 
systems change. Through a rhetorical analysis of Vaclav Havel's speeches in the 
aftermath of the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, I demonstrate that the 
experience of democratization is rooted in historical and cultural resources and that local 
actors can offer valuable alternative perspectives on democracy. Embracing such 
alternative political imaginations is a way to democratize the concept of democratization 
itself. 
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C H A P T E R  1. Introduction 
In the spring months of 20 1 1, we witnessed the spectacle of revolutions in the 
Middle East and North Africa. The media representations of the civil unrests show 
striking similarities to the ways in which democratization theories conceptualize 
democratic transition. Scholarly literature as well as the mainstream media tend to frame 
democratic transitions as a matter of success or failure. As a recent New York Times 
article stated, "This is a moment of great promise - and great risk - in the Arab world. 
Success is not assured."' The polarized response, with its accompanying notion that there 
could be only two outcomes of transition, masks our ability to see these instances of civil 
resistance as opportunities to cultivate new visions and imaginations of what freedom and 
democracy might look like. 
As the issue of democratization keeps coming up in our dynamic world, it seems 
like the more we learn about democratization and the more democratization finds its 
place in everyday language, the more mystified and uncontested our understanding of 
democracy becomes. It is as if each time we hear that a country ought to democratize or 
express joy that it is indeed democratizing, we affirm and reinforce models of democracy 
that are already in place. In doing so, we make a cultural assumption that one system - 
democracy - is a flawless way to organize society and political power. Democratizing 
countries share a crucial similarity with existing democracies, that is the desire for free 
public life. However, the understanding of how freedom ought to be institutionalized and 
lived out, is by no means universal. The decisions and ideas of what ought to constitute a 
new political environment following a repressive regime are grounded in culture, history, 
memory, and experience, and are thus unlikely to produce the same vision as those of 
already existing systems. 
Yet, democratization theorists have to a large extent reproduced the cultural 
assumptions of Westem-style liberal democracy, and subsequently characterize the 
democratization process as a linear progression from point A - a repressive regime, to 
point B - a Westem-style democracy. Our scholarly and media eyes look for familiarity 
around the world, hoping to recognize Western-style institutions and modes of thought. 
Furthermore, as my literature review will demonstrate, the available democratization 
theories are largely void of the voices of those involved in the transitions. Yet, to study 
democratization in an open-ended manner should admit the imperfection of existing 
democratic systems, and embrace the opportunity to learn from societies that are forming 
systems based in freedom. In other words, we need to investigate and challenge the 
cultural and social biases democracy carries when exported or studied in a foreign 
context. 
My thesis aims to connect democratization theory with the lived experiences of 
transition. Attention to the discursive constitution of the democratization process should 
reveal a culturally-grounded understanding of freedom and enrich our understanding of 
what it takes for a society to move forward from a repressive regime. A discursive 
approach constitutes not only a more contextualized view of democratization in any given 
place at a particular time, but also serves as a critique of the dominant models of 
democratization and creates space for an alternative understanding of the substance of 
democracy and democratic life. In other words, it allows us to recover and take seriously 
the voices, and therefore, political and theoretical agency of those on the ground and at 
the helm of democratic transitions. 
In this project, I am motivated by the desire to explore how democratization and 
democracy have been envisioned, experienced, and understood by societies undertaking 
this political transformation. More specifically, my study responds to the research 
question: "What ideas and insights can be gained from Havel's rhetoric in the early stages 
of Czechoslovakia's transition to democracy that may enrich and/or modify the way our 
currently scholarly literature understands the process of democratization?" In order to 
answer my research question, I turn to a set of selected speeches delivered by former 
Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel during his first year in Office. I approach the 
speeches less as examples of strategic political communication, and more so as artifacts 
of living political theory. In doing so I heed the call of rhetorical scholar James Arnt 
Aune who suggests that scholars should "view public address documents for what tliey 
really are: concrete instances of political judgment, embodiments of political 
philosophy."2 At the dawn of a new era for Czechoslovakia, Havel, along with the rest of 
the country, had to consider the basic questions of political philosophy: what is a state, 
what is a democracy, and what does it take to turn the idea of a democratic state into a 
2 James Arnt Aune, "Public Address and Rhetorical Theory," in Texls in Context: Critical Dialogues On 
Significant Episodes in American Political Rhetoric, ed. Michael C. Leff and Fred J. Kauffeld (Davis, 
CA: Hermagoras, 1989): 49. 
reality. My project accounts for this moment of profound political discernment. I aim to 
contribute to the current literature on democratization by taking stock of the ideas that 
emerged during this period of transition. By taking these ideas seriously, I believe, we 
can enrich not only our understanding of what democratization is or how it happens, but 
also our political imagination about what it could be or needs to be. 
In my study, I find three key ways in which Havel challenges some major 
theoretical postulations of the available socio-scientific and theoretical literature on 
democratization. First, in contrast to the dominant models of democratization, Havel does 
not understand transition as a temporally-bound linear process. Instead, he posits a 
dynamic, continuous process of social renewal. Second, the space of transition is not 
defined by the territorial and legal boundaries of the state as the literature suggests; 
instead for Havel transition occurs in the psycho-social and cultural layers of public life. 
Third, Havel's rhetoric challenges the literature's assumption that democratization is a 
script that needs to be adopted from outside. By utilizing mythic narratives, Havel instead 
illustrates that Czechoslovak society possesses collective agency for the transition, and 
its historical experiences with political transformations endow it with relevant cultural 
resources. Together, the speeches reveal that democratization is not simply a process of 
changing systems and institutions; rather it requires greater societal transformation. 
1.1. Czechoslovakia as a Site of Transition 
Why turn our attention to Czechoslovakia and Havel's ideas for the sake of 
furthering our understanding of democratization? The answer may seem simple: in the 
context of Central and East Europeans' struggles to overcome the legacies of 
communism, Havel emerged as a unique and clear voice with a unique and clear vision. 
His rhetoric, however, cannot and should not be disconnected from the discursive terrain 
of Czechoslovak society. Therefore, a brief recount of the historical and geopolitical 
context in which Havel spoke about the meaning and purpose of democratization is 
warranted. 
Czechoslovak identity as a state and a nation had always been tenuous. 
Czechoslovakia first gained statehood in 191 8 when it separated from the Habsburg 
empire. The first democracy, the so-called First Republic, lasted from 191 8 until the Nazi 
invasion of 1938. The first president, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, is often credited with the 
establishment of the state and referred to as "Taticek Masaryk" (Daddy Masaryk). Unlike 
what his glorified status may suggest, Masaryk's focus on morals and civic democratic 
culture did not sufficiently address Slovak concerns within the bi-national state. While 
Czechs admired Masaryk, Slovaks perceived him as an embodiment of Czech superiority 
and insufficient integration of Slovaks in decision-making processes.3 '~ence,  
Czechoslovakia's democratic heritage, although marked by pluralist society and elections, 
carried a cultural heritage of ethnic disputes. 
3 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle, WA: University of 
Washington Press, 1974), 120. 
4 Misha Glenny, The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy (London; New York: 
Penguin Books, 1990), 27. 
Czechoslovakia did not exist as a state during World War 11. Czech lands 
(Bohemia and Moravia) were subsumed by Hitler's forces into a Protectorate of Nazi 
Germany, whereas a portion of Slovak territory enjoyed relative autonomy. The end of 
World War 11. marked the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia, as Soviet-led forces 
liberated the country. During the "Victorious February" of 1948, the Communist Party 
gained power, and aligned itself with Soviet Russia, and is often cited as the start of 
Communist rule in Czechoslovakia. The communist regime grew in power until the 
1960s when the government attempted to liberalize its social policy under the slogan of 
"socialism with a human face". The policy was soon met with disapproval in Moscow, 
leading to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 2 1, 1 968. The following 
period, dubbed as the period of "Normalization" brought about increasing repression and 
persecution of dissidents. In this context, underground civil society groups began to form 
a resistance movement leading to the Velvet revolution on November 17, 1989 when 
students and artists went on strike and took to the streets effectively bringing down the 
communist regime. 
What was the meaning of the Velvet Revolution? How could it be construed in 
light of Czechoslovakia7s tenuous history? What was new and what was old about this 
event? Arguably Czechoslovakia has had many experiences of transition and 
transformation and like any other culture, it has made sense of and pushed through those 
periods with the help of historical narratives and mythology. Anthropologist Ladislav 
Holy argues that there are two dominant narratives of Czech history circulating in the 
culture, and that both emphasize different traditions in addressing national crises. 
Agency, the question of what drives and enables the society to move forward, has been 
the primary difference between these two ways of framing Czech h i~ tory .~  One side of 
the story posits Czechoslovakia as subject of history; the other one treats the nation as the 
object of history. While Czechs do not simply believe in one interpretation or the other, 
they associate each interpretation with certain characters from Czech history and with 
specific self-perception of agency. Thus the national imagination has long oscillated 
between a narrative of ownership and agency on the one hand, and a narrative of 
victimhood on the other. Which of these narratives would come forward could potentially 
determine the direction of transition. 
The two different images of history could offer two distinct interpretations of the 
Velvet Revolution. In the first approach, the Revolution could be interpreted as a 
successful outcome of an open revolt by students, dissidents and organized citizens. The 
second approach could see the revolution as a product of favorable conditions in 
international politics, or more cynically as the triumph of western propaganda. 
Indeed, many among the media, scholars, and the general public in the West saw 
the fall of the Berlin Wall as signifying the triumph of Westem-style liberal democracy, 
and putting the final dent into the East-West Cold War competition. However, now that 
the Cold War divisions have faded, though not disappeared, we are better equipped to 
recover the voices of post-communist experience. Have1 was one the most distinguished 
among those voices. Hence, the study of Havel's speeches and writings is not an instance 
of desperate nostalgia for the exhilaration of the Velvet Revolution; rather it is a journey 
5 Ladislav Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation: National Identity and the Post-Communist 
Transformation of Society, (Cambridge, NY Cambridge University Press, 1996), 127. 
to recover the moments of 1989 as ones of culturally grounded experience as opposed to 
passive acceptance of Western triumph. 
1.2. Vaclav Havel's Role in Czechoslovakia's Post-C om m u n i ~ t  Transit ion 
Still, the contemporary response to Havel painfully mirrors the Cold War divide 
between the East and West. Many in the Western world praise and admire Havel for his 
leadership qualities, inspirational philosophy and a concerned outlook toward the world. 
In former Czechoslovakia, however, Havel's fame slowly dissipated as the populace 
became increasingly more disillusioned with the hardships of transition. In part, Havel's 
stern rhetoric of truth and morals lost its appeal in the face of long-term domestic 
political struggles, and hence today, domestic views on Havel fall nowhere near the 
Western admiration. Twenty years after the Velvet Revolution, Havel finds himself at an 
intersection of unpopularity at home and eternal glorification abroad. One of Havel's 
most crucial characteristics and contributions gets lost amidst these disagreements over 
his persona - the strength and theoretical originality of a local voice for freedom. 
Havel contributed to the resistance movement in former Czechoslovakia in a 
variety of ways. In the 1960s, he was an editor of a small radical magazine and the chief 
spokesman for the non-communist faction of the Czechoslovak Writers' ~ n i o n . ~  In the 
1970s, Havel orchestrated two written manifestos - Several Sentences and the much 
larger and controversial Charter 77 - calling for the return to fundamental civic 
6 Paul R. Wilson, "Vaclav Havel in Word and Deed," in Critical Essays on Vaclav Havel, ed. Marketa 
Goetz-Stankiewicz and Carey Phyllis (New York: Twayne, 1999), 23. 
 freedom^.^ After founding the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted in 
1978, Havel was imprisoned for four years for "subversion." In the 1980s, Havel got 
involved in the Civic Forum, a non-communist opposition group, pressing for a regime 
change. Evidently, Havel was by no means perceived as a neutral figure. On the contrary, 
he was perceived as the leading character of the opposition movement and enjoyed 
popular support especially in the weeks following November 17', 1989, as Czechs took 
to the streets to commemorate protesters beaten by the police. In my thesis, I turn to 
Havel, for his voice incorporates resistance as well as vision. 
As the voice of the Velvet Revolution and its aftermath, Havel faced multiple 
rhetorical challenges. At the point of the Velvet Revolution, Havel's audience posed two 
key constraints on what he could talk about or say.' First, the Revolution was primarily 
led by students who organized public demonstrations in the late 1980s. As Sharon 
~ o l c h i k  suggests, "[Those born after the Soviet invasion in] 1968 felt a strong sense of 
alienation from the communist regime."g Young people provided the energy and fuel for 
the transition; yet their drive and imagination for the future had to be reconciled with the 
expectations of the rest of the population. Any instance of a revolution poses many 
challenges to a society, for it is abruptly faced with the unknown. To mitigate the fear of 
transitioning into the unfamiliar, Havel would have to portray the revolution as coming 
from the roots, and as an innate desire of the nation. He would have to activate the 
7 Vaclav Havel, Karel Hvizdala, and Paul R. Wilson, TO the Castle and Back(New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2007), 53. 
8 Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 1-14. 
9 Sharon Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economy; and Society (London; New York: 
Pinter, 1991), 212. 
nation's cultural resources through which the future could be made sense of and 
embraced. 
A second important challenge for Havel was that the majority of his audience had 
no extant memory of living in a democratic system. Many of them were born during the 
period of Normalization that is arguably the most oppressive period in the history of the 
totalitarian regime. Havel had to find a way to portray democratic values as innate to 
Czechs and Slovaks. He would have to recognize the fear of the unknown present amidst 
the audience and draw on the cultural resources and images of Czech and Slovak history 
to foster a sense of courage and to further the idea that democracy was a core Czech and 
Slovak value. The Velvet Revolution would have to owned by everyone and the future's 
promise would have to be embraced by everyone. In other words, if from the outside the 
fall of communism in Czechoslovakia looks like a part of a larger series of events in 
Central and Eastern Europe, post-communism and the transitions it unleashed would be 
experienced with intense communal intimacy and would have to be driven by local 
cultural and social understandings. 
Havel's rhetorical feat in navigating the transition and the breadth of his political 
imagination, however, can only be fully appreciated when juxtaposed with the now 
dominant models and understandings of democratization. For this reason, this thesis 
proceeds in three main steps. In chapter 2 I offer a literature review that examines in 
more detail the models and theories that currently dominate the scholarly literature on 
democratization. I point to particular questions and areas for research that a study of 
Havel's rhetoric can speak to. Next, in Chapter 3 I lay out my objects of study and 
provide a justification for my methodological approach. In Chapter 4 I present my 
analysis of Havel's theory of democratization. I conclude by highlighting Havel's 
contributions to our understanding of democratic transition and point to their continuing 
and crucial relevance in a global political environment where democratization remains an 
urgent and critical issue. 
C H APTE R 2. Literature Review: For W hom Democratization Tolls? 
How do societies transition from one mode of governance to another? And more 
specifically, how does a transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic system 
occur? These are the questions driving the scholarship on democratization within the field 
of political science. Emerging predominantly from the sub-field of comparative politics, 
the study of democratization has generally followed a social scientific script in which the 
development of a sophisticated, multi-dimensional model of democratic transition 
becomes the goal. In other words, the socio-scientific imagination guiding the study of 
democratic transition is focused less on understanding the local conditions of any specific 
case of democratization but more so on creating a complex and coherent theory of 
democratization that accounts for as many variables as possible for the sake of creating a 
recipe to guide future cases. 
We have to ask the question, then, who is democratization theory meant to serve? 
As the following literature review will reveal, the study of democratization is often 
conducted by outsiders, by scholars who have little personal affiliation with the 
transitional societies they study. This aspect of democratization theory is consistent with 
its socio-scientific roots which value presumed objectivity. Similarly, the consumers of 
democratization theory are predominantly Western institutions of expertise such as 
Western academia, think-tanks, and policy institutes, which too are not the primary 
agents of democratization but are outside observers or agents of influence. 
Democratization theory, therefore, has to be understood as an exercise in modeling, in 
constructing an image of transition that can then be applied prescriptively from outside to 
new political situations as they arise. Democratization theory, as it has emerged in the 
field of political science, in other words is not democratic-it neither represents, nor does 
it listen to, the voices of those who experience and imagine the transitions of their own 
societies. 
Yet, like any other study, my project can only find relevance in a conversation 
that has already begun. My own interest in Havel's understanding and vision for 
Czechoslovakia's transition is both motivated by and aims to add to the ongoing study of 
democratization theory. So in this literature review, I explore the key insights and 
assumptions of democratization theory and consider their relevance for the case of 
Czechoslovakia's transition. I then locate the areas where democratization falls short and 
the questions which democratization studies have been less equipped to address due to 
their methodological limitations. Those areas of study and theoretical questions open the 
space for my own project. Specifically, I point out the areas of democratization theory 
that can be enriched and modified by a consideration of Havel's politico-theoretical 
imagination and his vision of democratic transition. I also make a case for approaching 
democratization as a grounded, discursive process that requires close attention to the 
local rhetorical construction of the transition. 
2.1. Social Scientific Approaches to Democratization: Modeling Democratic 
Transition 
The literature on democratization has been growing; however, it remains a 
fragmented field of study.'' The theoretical study of democratization has largely 
originated in the field of comparative politics, where regional "waves" of transitions such 
as those in Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe have been studied. The 
primary objective of cross-regional and intra-regional comparative studies has been to 
identify variables that might play a role in a transition. These variables are then added to 
aggregate models of democratization which aim to represent the process of moving from 
a repressive regime to a democratic one. 
The post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe have not been a 
primary object of study, though they have been used to enrich the available socio- 
scientific models of transitional democracy. As long as modeling is the object of 
democratization theory, each new case of regime change can yield new dimensions and 
determinants to be considered. So why would the particularities of Central and East 
European matter for the democratization literature? Could they be of interest because, as 
Pridham and Vanhanen point out, the fall of communism in the region sparked a dual 
transition as the states' efforts to build a democratic system of governance were 
simultaneously accompanied by a transition from a centrally controlled economy to a 
market-driven model?" Pridham seems to suggest that those cases matter less for 
10 GeoEey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen, "Introduction," in Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic 
and International Perspectives, ed. Geofli-ey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 2. 
11 Pridharn and Vanhanen, "Introduction," in Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Europe, 
disturbing or enriching the political imagination of democratization theory. Rather, the 
study of these cases has made a more mundane contribution, that of bringing the field of 
democratization theory together. l2 
It is important, therefore, to consider what are the key insights of democratization 
theory so far and to identify the central questions guiding the field. So what does it take 
for a society to move toward a democratic system of government? A survey of the 
literature reveals that there are two ways of approaching this question. These two threads 
in the literature, though related, seem to ask slightly different questions. The first thread 
features structural models of democratization. Scholarship within this area has been 
concerned primarily with identifying and describing the institutions, regulations, and 
governing practices essential for the creation of a democratic system. The second thread 
is somewhat less concerned with the institutional infrastructure of a democratic system 
and more interested in the way the system is inhabited. Such scholarship focuses on the 
role of civil society in democratization and it aims to develop models for political 
participation in transition. The following sections provide some more detail on these 
threads in the democratization literature. 
2.1 .l. Structural  Models of Democratization 
There seems to be a strong presumption in the democratization literature that 
states and not societies per se undergo transitions. Structural models of democratization 
4, 
12 Pridham, "Democratic Transitions in Theory and Practice," in Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratization 
in Eastern Europe, 16. 
often position the state as the primary terrain and tool of political transformation. For 
them democracy is essentially a state system. For example, in their large volume on 
democratic transition and consolidation, Linz and Stepan assert that a state presents an 
essential pre-condition for a democracy. For them, 
Democracy is a form of governance of life in a polis in which citizens have rights 
that are guaranteed and protected. To protect the rights of its citizens and to 
deliver the other basic services that citizens demand, a democratic government 
needs to be able to exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force in the territory.13 
In this perspective, democracy is a dynamic of state formation. It is marked by the 
development of structures and procedures that define the roles, privileges, and duties of 
citizens. Democracy, is in essence, treated as a system of government, a network of 
institutions and regulated practices. 
So what should a democratic state system look like? This question is the subject 
of much debate in the democratization literature and it betrays a key assumption of such 
scholarship, namely, the assumption that democratization is a linear process of transition 
toward a fixed, identifiable, singular model of government. Some scholars are more alert 
than others as to the political philosophy underwriting their models of democratic 
systems. For example, Rengger identifies two types of democracy that have been posited 
as the end-goals of transitions: Standard Liberal Democracy (SLD) and Expansive 
13 Juan J. Linz and Alfied C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 10-11. 
Democracy (ED). Unlike Kaldora and Vejvoda who draw the line between these two 
models on the sphere in which democratic activity is grounded (institutionalization vs. 
civil society), Rengger explores the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the 
democratic system that is being advocated for. For him, Standard Liberal Democracy 
situates the individual self as a pre-political subject the interests of whom are mediated 
through the democratic process in order to cope with the clashes occuring between 
individual interests.I4 Expansive democracy positions the individual's interests as 
malleable and negotiable with communitarian interests in mind. 
Although the presence of ED in certain contexts has been acknowledged, the 
literature does not offer a transitional understanding on how a particular experience of a 
repressive regime would lead to yielding an alternative to SLD. In other words, neither 
one of these models of democracy - Standard Liberal Democracy or Expansive 
Democracy - can be linked to the experiences or imaginations of any one transitional 
society. Rather, they appear in the literature as the result of the institutional practices of 
the democratization scholarship itself - the detachment of its theoretical roots from the 
experiences and voices of transitional societies and the institutionalized hegemony of 
western liberal understandings of democracy. 
Consequently, calls have been made for the creation of more nuanced 
understandings of the structural and dynamic features of a democratic system. For 
example, Kaldor and Vejvoda suggest that democratic systems can be divided into 
14 N. J. Rengger, "Towards a Culture of Democracy: Democratic Theory and Democratization in Eastern 
and Central Europe," in Building Democracy?: The lnfernafional Dimension of Democratization in 
Eastern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1994),61. 
formative and substantial. A formative democracy is comprised of rules and procedures 
for government. By contrast, substantive democracy constitutes "a process that has to be 
continually reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way as to maximize 
the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, to 
participate in and influence debates about the key decisions that affect society."1s The 
definitional approach of Kaldor and Vejvoda's model, however, tells us very little about 
what it takes for a society to bring into action one form of democracy or the other. 
An example of a more constitutively dynamic structural model of democracy can 
be found in the work of Pridham. Pridham proposes a state-society model of 
democratization. Although constructing a liberal democracy remains to be the end goal of 
democratization, Pridham's approach offers a more dynamic theoretical lens through 
which transitions can be understood. For him, three components figure as important 
variables in a democratic transition - state-level institutions and procedures, societal 
actors and their involvement in the process, and inter-group relations that includes 
relationships between different actors (e.g., political elites, military, etc.). l6 It is the 
interaction between these variables that allows for a transition to a democratic system. 
Pridham analyzes the Southern European transitions through the state-society model, and 
assesses the degree to which the variables in his model could be applicable to Eastern 
European transitions. However, at the time of his work, many Eastern European 
transitions were still in their beginnings, hence drawing firm ties about the nature of 
15 Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe (London; New York: 
Pinter, 1999), 4. 
16 Pridham, "Democratic Transitions in Theory and Practice," in Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratization 
in Eastern Europe, 20. 
transitions vis-a-vis their outcomes would have been premature. Still, it is important to 
note that Pridham's model provides space and a role to societal actors and groups. Thus, 
the model is potentially more open-ended and seems more attuned to local cultural and 
social conditions, 
The utility of modeling as a tool of democratization theory, however, is not 
without limits, especially if prediction is the goal. However, instead of abandoning 
modeling as a methodological choice, the literature seems to have only further 
intensified the search for variables and structural preconditions to determine the 
trajectory and outcome of a transition. Tatu Vanhanen's evolutionary theory of 
democratization is an example of this type of predictive modeling. Vanhanen created 
several variables - such as the Index of Power Resources or Index of Democratization - 
to assess a country's level of democratization. Vahnanen's model represents a Darwinian 
notion of politics, in so far as it assumes that political actors compete for power in order 
to secure scarce resources. Democratization occurs when the power has been distributed 
among so many actors that no single group maintains a monopoly over resources. l7  It 
ought to be noted, however, that none of these variables account for historical or cultural 
variation, since Vanhanen's evolutionary theory presumes that the struggle for resources 
constitutes an essential characteristic of human nature. 
Driven by a similar desire to identify and operationalize the key determinants of a 
democratic system, Vanhanen and Kimber's provide an evolving quantitative framework 
for illuminating the relationship between various socio-economic factors and level of 
17 Vanhanen and Kimber, "Predicting and Explaining Democratization in Eastern Europe," in Pridham and 
Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Europe, 63. 
democratization. Different statistical incarnations of their model yielded slightly 
conflicting results and a re-structuring of the variables allowed for better prediction of the 
1989 transitions. Their findings show that while democratization cannot be predicted 
solely on the basis of socio-economic conditions, those conditions limit and constrain the 
democratization process. la 
Efforts to grasp the nature of democratic transitions through attention to the 
structural elements of state systems invariably fall short, They do so despite their 
exhaustive attention to structural details and despite the sophistication of their modeling 
techniques. Rather, they fall short because by its very nature, as some of the scholars in 
this area themselves admit, democratization is a dynamic process contingent on the 
actions of those who inhabit the transitional state system. The attention, therefore, has 
turned to the models of participation that can drive a transition toward democratic 
government. 
2.1.2. Participatory Models of Democratization 
The second important thread of research on democratization has focused on the 
role that local participants can play in a transition. Such studies aim to evaluate the 
significance and differentiate between different types of political actions. Most of the 
studies in this thread locate the participatory dimension of democratization within the 
concept of civil society. Civil society is the link that political theorists posit between the 
structures and subjects of a democratic system. 
18 Ibid., 85. 
Civil society matters not only for putting democratization in practice, but also for 
legitimizing it both internally and externally. By tracing civil society developments in 
Poland and former Czechoslovakia from 1970s until the early 1990s, for example, Glenn 
introduces the "civil society master frame" model through which we can access domestic 
and international context simultaneously. For him, civil society navigates the potential 
and constraints of domestic and international political opportunities. It does not constitute 
a measurable dimension of democratization, rather it constitutes a fluid body of political 
mobilization that articulates broad concerns regarding regime change. l9 Civil societies 
deploy "frames" - a set of claims responding to key political opportunities facing them - 
that in turn influence their pathway to democracy. 
Unfortunately, Glenn is one of the very few democratization scholars to credit 
local actors for their creative power, for their ability to create culturally specific modes of 
understanding and implementing a democratic transition. The majority of studies focus 
instead on charting the rules, types, and modes for participation necessary for a 
democratic transition. Thus, they see participation only functionally, as yet another tool 
necessary to put some preconceived structural conditions in place so that an externally 
conceived and recognizable democratic system might ensue. 
For example, a volume co-edited by Dawisha and Parrott offers a series of 
country-specific studies examining the role of political participation in achieving 
democratic consolidation in East-Central Europe. Collectively, the works of this volume 
highlight the premise that elite and mass political participation constitutes a key 
19 John K. Glenn, Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 50. 
dimension through which the level of democratic consolidation can be assessed. 
However, these studies share a minimalist definition of democracy: "Democracy is a 
political system in which [the] leaders of the government are chosen within regular 
intervals through elections [. . .] and other procedures, such as freedom of the press and 
assembly, that ensure real opportunities for electoral competition."20 In such studies, 
participation is limited to electoral democratic politics. By investigating topics such as 
public attitudes, pluralistic party systems, electoral systems, and political culture, authors 
approach political participation in each case study in mid-1 990s against the idea of a 
consolidated democracy. In other words, each study is not attuned to local conditions, 
structures, or understandings of democracy but it evaluates political participation against 
an ideal model of democracy. Thus, this co-edited volume represents a functionalist 
approach dominant in academic debates on democratization in that it relies on milestones 
and measures to assess overall progress and frames democratization as successful or 
unsuccessful. 
The dominance of this approach, however, is not without its critics. Parrot 
identifies a limitation in functionalist approaches when he states that, 
Care is also required in applying the notion of democratic transitions. . . . It may 
be true that liberal democracy has become the prevailing model of modem politics 
in much of the world. But both historical experience and a priori reasoning 
suggest that a spectrum of possible post-communist outcomes still exists. This 
20 Bruce Parrott, "Perspectives on Post-Communist Democratization," in The Consolidation of Democracy 
in East-Central Europe, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4. 
spectrum includes variants of democracy, variants of authoritarianism, and some 
hybrids in b e t ~ e e n . ~ '  
Although Dawisha and Parrott do not explicitly call democratization theory into question, 
the in-depth case studies featured in their volume highlight individual differences in 
pathways toward consolidation in each country. Many of these differences can be 
attributed to the creative and constitutive power of local actors. 
Local actors, their actions, and not the least, their imaginations, need to be given 
more space in democratization theory. The rejection of a uniform democratization 
trajectory is further pursued by Glenn challenges the idea of an Eastern European "wave" 
of democratization more explicitly by positing that the idea of a "democratization wave" 
overemphasizes the importance of the external context (collapse of communism), and 
does not sufficiently consider the domestic political movements involved in 
democratization. Furthermore, his work addresses the assumption that the outcome of 
democratization processes is a "cookie-cutter" democratic system. Glenn argues that 
"differences across countries in Eastern Europe had consequences for the founding of 
democratic states that are otherwise obscured, most notably differences in the patterns of 
negotiation and mobilization that led to the creation of new political insti t~tions."~~~his 
approach situates transition/reconstruction of the state at the intersection of the domestic 
context of each country and the greater international context of the end of the Cold War. 
Glenn's argument is important for this thesis because it disputes two ideas that 
often appear in democratization studies of post-communist transitions. These also happen 
21 Ibid., 5. 
22 Glenn, Framing Democracy, 15. 
to be ideas that this thesis aims to challenge as well, though for reasons different from 
Glenn's. The first ideas is that Eastern European countries began to build democracy 
from scratch. The significance of this notion is profound. It justifies the democratization 
literature's unassuming adoption of western liberal models of democracy as the only 
possible end-goals of a tradition and leaves little space for the creative power of local 
communities. Furthermore, it implicitly seems to suggest that for non-western societies . 
democracy is somehow alien, and only an intensive intervention from outside could set 
them on the "right" track. The second idea that Glenn rejects is the notion that there is, 
can be, and should be a "pre-ordained path for demo~ratization."~~ Like Glenn, I find this 
idea as simply undemocratic, because it once again leaves no creative agency to the 
subjects of transition. Unlike Glenn, however, I attribute the predominance of this idea to 
the methodological bias of the democratization literature. The socio-scientific approach 
to the study of transition with its reductive treatment of empirical evidence and its over- 
reliance on prescriptive modeling effectively de-populates the emergent democracies. 
Little local knowledge or desire is meaningful or necessary for a transition. Thus, the 
point of democratization studies, inadvertently perhaps, shifts from "how do societies 
transition to democracy" to "how can a democracy be imposed on a society." These 
fundamental critiques of the literature on democratization deserve a closer look. 
23 Ibid., 192. 
2.2. Shortcomings of t h e  Socio-scientific Approach to Democratization 
In sum, the democratization literature seems to have clustered around three key 
concepts - democratic transition, democratic consolidation, and democracy. Democratic 
transithrefers to a process of regime change that occurs between the fall of the non- 
democratic regime and a state of affairs 
when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce 
an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct 
result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority 
to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power 
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies 
de j ~ r e . " ~ ~  
Transition is hence understood as a process of systems-change whereby the power 
previously located within a dictatorship or totalitarian regime has been distributed 
amongst the citizens through the adoption of rules and procedures. 
Studies devoted to democratic consolidation are primarily interested in the way a 
democracy takes shape and takes hold in a society. The term "democratic consolidation" 
extends beyond the initial installation of procedures. Democratic consolidation is 
associated with a level of stability, as it refers to "the gradual removal of the uncertainties 
that invariably surround transition and . . . the full institutionalization of the new 
democracy, the internalization of its rules and procedures and the dissemination of 
24 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 3.  
democratic values."25 Therefore, democratic consolidation is the outcome of democratic 
transition. 
The concept that is most fundamental to the democratization literature, however, 
is democracy. Yet this is also the concept that seems to be the least attended to. The 
democratization literature seems to simply presume that (a) there is such a thing as a 
democracy, (b) that a democracy can be created where it didn't exist before, and (c) that a 
transition to a democracy can be a rational, disciplined, linear process. Underlying these 
presumptions is an unreflexive allegiance of Western models of liberal democracy. These 
assumptions are fundamental limitations and drawbacks in theoretical approaches to 
transitions. Collectively, I would fault them primarily for not providing a lens through 
which alternative conceptions of democracy can be captured and analyzed. 
In this section, I will elaborate on two critiques of the assumptions of 
democratization theories that this thesis seeks to address by turning to Vaclav Havel's 
conception of democratization. First, democratization theories apply a temporal 
framework to transition, identifying a clear starting point and a pre-determined outcome. 
In doing so, they approach democratization as an ahistorical process. Second, the 
democratization literature has conceptualized history and culture as static concepts that 
can be used only in order to make predictions about the success or failure of 
democratization. As a result the democratization theory seems ill equipped and even 
reluctant to take into account the cultural and historical legacies and discursive resources 
that make transitions dynamic, lived, and ultimately, democratic, processes. 
25 Pridham and Vanhanen, "Introduction," in Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratization in Eastern Europe, 
2. 
2.2.1. Transition as a Linear Process 
As suggested above, most research on democratization theory operationalizes the 
process of democratization as temporally confined by the end of a repressive regime and 
the installment of democratic rule. In order to recognize when the objective of 
democratization has been reached, Pridham and Vanhanen outline criteria that can be 
used to classify a democratic transition as completed, 
Transition tasks involve, above all, negotiating the constitutional settlement and 
settling the rules of procedure for political conlpetition, but also dismantling 
authoritarian agencies and abolishing laws unsuitable for democratic life.26 
In short, stable institutions and systems that ensure power distribution in society 
indicate the completion of the transition project. 
Elaborating on the temporal aspects of democratization, Pridham argues for a 
linear fiarnework that compartmentalizes transition into three phases - the inaugural 
phase, the constituent phase, and the completion phase. An assumption of Western-style 
liberal democracy and democratization as a strictly system-driven change remains 
palpable throughout Pridham's fraineworl<. The initial phase entails a commitment to re- 
distributing power in a democratic manner including "at least, a [reasonably clear] 
strategic decision to opt for a liberal democratic type of system."27 The constituent phase 
consists of institutionalization of democratic procedures such as the constitution. A state 
26 Ibid. 
27 GeoMey Pridham, "International Dimension of Democratization" in Pridham, Herring and Sanford, 
Building Democracy?, 15. 
enters the completion phase when the institutional and procedural aspects of democracy 
have been fully implemented and widely accepted by the citizenry. 
By complying with a linear Eramework, such studies tend to articulate a 
dichotomy of success and failure, in which a country is either successful in fulfilling the 
democratic criteria, or it reverts back to authorian rule. Glenn argues that 
[We] should not be studying "democracy" as a dichotomous variable (either 
present or absent) but rather democratization as a continuous variable (as 
processes by which the relationship between the state and its citizens changes 
through the holding of free elections, the creation of accountable political 
institutions, and the guaranteeing of Ereedom of association and the protection of 
civil rights).28 
This approach disrupts the linear understanding of democratization, but does not 
sufficiently challenge the time-bound aspect of democratization theory. 
Although a linear understanding of democratization may initially appear intuitive, 
the insistence on democratization as a fulfillment of criteria does not permit us to ask the 
question, "What does a society -given its historical and cultural context- expect after the 
fall of a non-democratic regime? What do they imagine ought to replace the repressive 
rule?" Instead, democratization theory constructs the key objectives of democratization 
and neglects examining these objectives within the context of the societal experience of 
transition. In a review essay on Eastern European transitions, Ghia Nodia notes a 
reluctance to engage the language of transition on the part of some authors. Instead, some 
28 Glenn, Framing Democracy, 10. 
scholars have adopted the term "transformation" in order to emphasize the unknown 
outcome of the abrupt political changes in 1 989.2Y A transformation approach lifts the 
pressure of "democratic expectations" and extends the metaphorical field of theory 
beyond functionalism and the genetic approach. Similarly, Ramet's definition of 
transition circumvents the assumption of establishing specific democratic institutions, for 
she conceptualizes transition as "processes that span the period of instability between the 
breakdown of a once stable political pattern and the attainment of a new equilibrium, a 
new stability."30 An alternative approach to the temporal dynamics of transition would 
pay attention to the way time is managed rhetorically. Consequently, one of the key 
elements I will seek to discover in Havel's speeches is how he manages the time and 
timing of transition, how he makes meaning of the present, reings in the past, and makes 
the future seem possible. 
2.2.2. The Problem of History and Culture 
My turn to the rhetoric of Vaclav Have1 also responds to a second problem with 
the available democratization literature. Democratization theory divorces the process of 
transition from the historical and cultural setting in which it occurs. The assertion that the 
primary goal of democratization is simply the installation of a new system renders the 
process ahistorical. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe manifested the potency of 
history at times of uncertainty in a number of ways - the rise of nationalist discourses, 
29 Ghia Nodia, "Chasing the Meaning of "Post-Communism": A Transitional Phenomenon or Something 
to Stay?" Contemporary European History9, no. 2 (2000), 270. 
30 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Whose Democracy?: lationalism, Religion, the Doctrine of Collective Rights in 
Post- 1989 Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 19. 
appeals to democratic systems from the interwar period, and a call for a geopolitical as 
well as historical "return to ~ u r o ~ e . " ~ '  However, democratization theory has failed to 
incorporate these powerful manifestations of historical and cultural legacies and allow 
them to challenge its basic premises. Given that the dominant theoretical approaches to 
democratization stress the importance of prediction, historical aspects of transition fall 
vicitms to the larger socio-scientific framework, "The historical dimension is important in 
so far as it brings into play functionalist concerns while providing a necessary context to 
the transition itself."32 In other words, the dominant democratization approach seeks to 
operationalize historical experiences into variables in order to strengthen the predictive 
power of functionalist methods and in the process, those experiences are fixed, 
externalized, and ultimately sterile. 
By reducing key historical events to variables, the socio-scientific approach to 
democratization loses the capacity to engage with the ideas that those specific historical 
periods gave rise to. As a result, historical analysis becomes devoid of socio-cultural 
understanding of politics and governance, for it is viewed for correlational and causal 
links between specific structures. For example, scholars argue that countries that 
experienced democratic rule prior to the onset of totalitarianism are more likely to 
consolidate faster.33 34 These studies conceptualize "democratic experience" as the 
presence of interwar democracy and pluralistic party systems. In doing so, they treat this 
3 1 George Sanford, "Communism's Weakest Link - Democratic Capitalism's Greatest Challenge," in 
Pridham, Herring and Sanford, Building Democracy?, 202. 
32 Pridham, "Democratic Transitions in Theory and Practice," in Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratization 
in Eastern Europe, 17. 
33 Andrew A. Michta, "Democratic Consolidation in Poland 1989," in Dawisha and Parrott, The 
Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern Europe, 68. 
34 Maurizio Cotta, "Building Party Systems after Dictatorship," in Pridham and Vanhanen, 
Democratization in Eastern Europe, 107. 
experience as a static predictor, rather than a dynamic historical resource from which 
societies can draw during the transition. 
Another example of the limitations of democratization theory's static conception 
of communal experience can be found in Michta who suggests that the presence of 
interwar democracy provides "historical legitimation" for the new democratic systems 
that began emerging in 1989. Michta's argument assumes a notion of history as a self- 
evident determinant of future events. Subsequently, such approach pays insufficient 
attention to how history is understood by the leaders of the emerging democracies and the 
citizenry at large. In other words, Michta's study does not provide an account of how 
historical legitimation occurs, and it is based in the assumption that past experience of 
pluralistic systems have inherent bearing on the forming of new democratic institutions. 
The democratization literature thus does not treat history as a socially constructed 
phenomenon. For a richer understanding of the lived quality of historical discourse and 
its significance for political transitions, we need to look elsewhere. Nationalism scholars 
shed light on the relationship between experiences with past systems and democratization 
efforts by discussing the concept of political memory. In Fantasies of Salvation, Vladimir 
Tismaneanu pursues a project on the emergence and impact of political myth in the 
aftermath of communism in Eastern Europe. Tismaneanu's project departs from studying 
political actors and defined indicators of political progress, and focuses on the "spiritual 
reactions to the discomfitures of the tran~ition."~~~olitical rhetorics constitute a spiritual 
response to the abrupt political change. Discourses about the past, present, and future 
35 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 14. 
derive their power from providing clear answers in circumstances of chaos and 
uncertainty, and as such are not inherently negative. In referencing myths as a particular 
discursive mode for addressing cultural identity, Tismaneanu points to the role of rhetoric 
in structuring collective experiences and political orientations. He states, ". . . myth [is 
not] a necessarily mendacious vision of reality but . . . a narrative that is able to inspire 
collective loyalties, affinities, passions, and actions."36 Therefore, attention to political 
rhetoric can be seen as a means to taking seriously how communal memories, historical 
tradition, and most importantly, political imaginations fill a political and ideological 
vacuum following the Revolutions of 1989. 
Tismaneanu's project points the way to an alternative approach to the politics and 
processes of democratization. It points to the dynamic, discursive underpinnings of 
political transitions. It is with this perspective in mind that I turn to the next section of my 
thesis in which I explain and justify my decision to explore democratization as a 
discursive process. 
36 Ibid., 15. 
C H A P T  E R 3. Methodological 0 rientation and 0 bject of Study 
To address my research question, namely, what insights about the character of 
democratization can be gained from the rhetoric of local leaders, I analyze two speeches 
delivered by Vaclav Havel, the first president of post-communist Czechoslovakia, during 
his first year in Office. Even though the period of transition can be operationalized and 
de-contextualized through the methodological approaches of comparative politics, the 
societies themselves do not treat transition as an abstract and purely structural 
phenomenon. To these societies, the transition was a lived experience characterized by 
much uncertainty and large-scale changes. Thus, the experience of political change 
became a part of public discourse and was narrated through existing resources. 
Whitehead suggests that "pre-existing democratic "memories" and traditions may well 
persist and retain the power to affect the course and content of an eventual re- 
demo~ratization."~~ Historical experience in and of itself does not serve as a legitimating 
factor for a new democratic order, but a thorough study of the way discourse constitutes 
the democratic system can expand the study of democratization beyond the notion of 
minimal democracy and the help us appreciate the process of transition beyond its linear 
conceptualization in the literature. 
37 Laurence Whitehead, "East-Central Europe in Comparative Perspective," in Pridham, Herring, and 
Sanford, Building Democracy?, 34. 
3.1. Methodological 0 rientation: The Discursive Approach 
Together, the temporal conceptualization and lack of integration of historical 
experiences into democratization theory conceal the imagination of democracy and the 
democratization process on a society's own terms. I argue that these methodological 
limitations can be overcome by adopting a discursive approach to the study of transitions. 
In other words, if we wish to study the idea of democracy, how it is constituted, 
circulated, and reconstructed in a social milieu, we ought to adopt a method of study that 
allows us to access, investigate, and evaluate ideas. In this section, I will outline the 
discursive approach and discuss its potential contributions to democratization theory. 
The study of ideas in political science has been problematic, as scholars often 
classified the role of ideas as supplementary to existing fields of research. According to 
Finlayson, ideas have been filtered out of political science as "statistical noise," or used 
as additional evidence for instrumentalist arguments aimed at explaining political 
beha~ior.~' Hence a thorough study of ideas has eluded the field, leaving it with over- 
reliance on models of political behavior, shielding away from fully understanding the 
structure, meaning and origin of arguments. 
Determining the directionality between ideas and political events constitutes a- 
chicken-and-an-egg problem in political science methods. Political science traditionally 
understands ideas as products of the environment and political events. Rhetoricians 
challenge this succession by arguing that the concepts embodied by ideas affect the 
subsequent political realities, 
38 Alan Finlayson, "Political Science, Political Ideas, and Rhetoric," Economy and Society33, no. 4 
(November 2004): 530. 
In politics, ideas and concepts are not social scientific in nature: they are political. 
Their function is not necessarily to be accurate or even adequate descriptions of 
the world. A concept such as globalization, when employed by political actors, is 
a political tool of use in persuading others of the virtue or necessity of a particular 
political course of action. It helps make certain things thinkable in certain ways 
and can contribute to the construction of broad coalitions of support (a rather 
different way of describing 'collective co-~rdination').~~ 
The rhetorical approach hence reveals the dynamic nature of concepts and the ways in 
which they shape political realities and structures. In the context of post-communist 
Europe, such approach can drastically reverse our understanding of democratization. 
Rather than seeing democratic ideas and concepts as products of increasing 
institutionalization, the type of institutions and the process of implementing regime 
change can be seen as stemming from the discourse on democracy present in society. 
The discursive lens, in particular, addresses the issue of transition as a temporal 
phenomenon, for it does not presuppose a goal or standard against which success or 
failure is measured, instead it poses open-ended questions regarding the internal logic of 
the idea, the expectations it projects, and the rhetor's relationship with the audience. By 
broadening the scope of analytical questions and simultaneously inquiring into the 
context in which ideas emerge, the rhetorical analysis provides us with tools to capture 
new ideation. As Finlayson suggests, 
39 Ibid., 536. 
[Rlhetorical political analysis is interested in expansion as well as limits; 
affirmation as well as critique; in the possibility of constructing something new. 
And this focus on creativity may turn out to have normative and critical effects 
achieved not through the daring revelation of falsehoods or the dramatic exposure 
of a hidden interest but by helping us see how things can be done differently: 
through the encouragement of a proper appreciation of political rhetoric that not 
only helps us think and argue better but gives us a better idea of political action 
against which we might judge our politics.'"0 
Therefore, accessing democratization through discourse addresses issues the 
problem of history and culture in transition studies, as any analysis of discourse requires 
a close attention to the historical and cultural context of the society in question. This is of 
particular importance in Eastern Europe, for the socio-cultural experience of communism 
has been studied primarily for its constraints on democratization, rather than a potential 
source of new forms of societal and political organization. However, coming from the 
field of cultural studies, Kennedy draws a link between culture, history, and the building 
of democracy when he states that, "the culture landscape matters in the construction of 
communism's successor, and that the formation of ideologies and identities is more 
complicated than most discourses of transition allow."41 Rengger further elaborates on 
the problem of democracy in democratization studies, "Minimal definitions of 
democracy, however convenient, however "rigorous" they may appear to be, and 
however preferable to non-democratic alternatives, are actually normative choices 
40 Ibid., 542. 
4 1 Michael D. Kennedy, Envisioning Eastern Europe: Postcommunist Cultural Studies (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994), 1. 
working in defense of the status ~ l u o . " ~ ~ ~ h e  met odological ability to recover alternative 
understandings of democracy allows us to uncover the normative assumptions of existing 
democratic notions, and challenge those notions through alternative models present in 
political imagination arising from transitions. 
3.2. Objec t  of Study 
My primary objects of study are two speeches delivered by Havel within the first 
two years following the Velvet Revolution. The first speech is his New Year Address 
delivered on January lSt, 1990. This speech is of particular importance for it was the first 
presidential address after the fall of Communism. The Velvet Revolution erupted on 
November 17 '~ 1989. The subsequent negotiations with the Communist leadership 
resulted in the Civic Forum taking power. The Civic Forum, led by Vaclav Havel, 
consisted of various dissident groups such as former clergymen, actors, etc. On 
December 28', 1989, Vaclav Havel was officially declared president of Czechoslovakia. 
The first address was thus delivered only a few days after his naming into Office. 
The second speech that I focus on was delivered exactly a year later, on January 
lSt, 1991. It was also a New Year's Address. Like the first one, it was delivered as part of 
a long tradition of public address in Czechoslovakia. The annual New Year addresses are 
similar to the State of the Union addresses in the United States, as they aim to 
communicate the government's accomplishments from the previous year and lay out an 
42 Rengger, "Towards a Culture of Democracy," in Pridham, Herring, and Sanford, Building Democracy?, 
78. 
agenda for the months to come. A New Year's Address has been a tradition in the Czech 
Republic and former Czechoslovakia since 1 9 4 9 . ~ ~  A New Year's Address is evaluative 
and diagnostic in nature; intended to provide a reflection on the past year, and a vision for 
the following one. As the process of democratization continued, the goal of defining 
democracy becomes less of a central focus of presidential addresses. 
I will now share the rationale for selecting the two speeches that act as primary 
objects of analysis for my thesis. This thesis aims to explore the imagination and 
expectations of democracy that emerged from the experiences of communism. Have1 
delivered several public addresses a year. The first speech - the New Year's Address of 
1990 - was selected because it is the very first presidential address given after the regime 
change. Including the first-ever post-communist address is of particular importance in 
this period because of the assumption that speech constitutes a particularly powerful 
means of governance in democratic societies. Hence, the 1990 Address offers us a 
"snapshot" of Havel's initial vision for the transition and marked his difference from the 
Communist regime that had just disintegrated. By contrast, the 1991 Address was 
delivered in a political environment that lacked the revolutionary euphoria of 1990. Still, 
this address continued to reflect the challenges of "creating a democracy from scratch" 
and laid out an original vision of democratic transition that did not follow the blueprint of 
liberal democratic theory. 
43 Ladislav Dvorak, "Christmas and New Year's Address Tradition Founded under Tomas Garrigue 
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I suggest that viewing the two speeches together can allow us to identify content 
and tone that may be attributed to a very specific moment (such as the euphoria of the 
Velvet Revolution). They also mark the birth of a new democratic vision. Furthermore, 
focusing on speeches from the first years of post-communism as opposed to a longer 
period provides us with a way to share the experiential, lived quality of the transition 
during its most fragile initial moment. The primary purpose of both of these speeches was 
to communicate the essence and substance of democracy to society. Therefore, the 
contain narratives, metaphors, and other rhetorical resources that they utilize that can be 
used to answer my research question about how democratization was envisioned, 
understood, discursively created. 
3.3. Analytical Technique 
To extract Havel's theory of democratization, I performed a close textual analysis 
of his speeches. My engagement with the texts took several steps. I began by writing 
paragraph-by-paragraph analysis: For each paragraph of each of the speeches, I wrote a 
paragraph of analysis. I asked questions such as: What is the purpose of this paragraph? 
How does (through what means) Have1 achieve the purpose? And what does it reveal 
about how he views the country's transformation to democracy? The purpose of this step 
was to experience closely the flow and tone of the speeches. 
As a second step, I identified the extended metaphors and narrative themes that 
spanned each speech as a whole. I looked particularly for clusters of metaphors that 
referenced a similar idea. Next, I compared the narratives and themes in the two speeches 
paying close attention to what changed and what stayed consistent in Havel's approach to 
the issue of democratization. I approached the texts with the following questions: What 
do the similarities tell us about democratic imagination? Is there a keystone of Havel's 
democratic philosophy that cannot be easily "shaken up" by the unstable politics of 
democratic transitions? What do differences in imagination tell us about the course of the 
transition and the goal toward which Have1 sees the country moving? 
% 
Finally, I isolated the themes that addressed most directly the questions behind the 
study of democratization as defined in the scholarly literature. The themes and issues I 
cover in Chapter 4 are those that most explicitly challenge and, therefore, enrich the 
available scholarly conceptualization of democratic transition. In other words, Chapter 4 
does not aim to capture all the various ideas and insights that Havel has developed on the 
topic of democratization. Rather, my analysis is focused on identifying Havel's ideas that 
can respond to the shortcomings of the available literature as I identified them in Chapter 
CHAPTER 4. Analysis: Havel's Vision of Democratization as Discursive 
Transformation 
Despite the excitement and euphoria of the Velvet Revolution, at the time of 
Havel's first presidential address, the public was in the grips of a profound sense of 
uncertainty. What just happened? What was going on? What would happen from then on? 
People in Czechoslovakia had few discursive frames through which to fully make sense 
of the new realities they were facing and to express their hopes and imaginations about 
their future. The fall of communism was also a collapse of ideological discursive frames 
that had up to the moment of the Velvet revolution been structuring the nation's 
collective narrative of identity and purpose in the world. From within the ruins of the old 
narrative regime, and to some extent from the materials left from it, the blueprint of the 
new society would have to be created. In addressing the nation, Havel acknowledged the 
role of favorable conditions in the sphere of international politics. Indeed, from the 
outside at least the Czechoslovak revolution was just one more piece moving in the 
domino-like collapse of communism as an international regime. For the people in the 
midst of that event, however, the turn toward democracy felt profoundly intimate. As 
Havel emphasized, the revolution came from within and was motivated by the citizens' 
inner calling for democracy. 
What would this democracy look like? For many in Havel's audience the notion 
of democracy was derived from images of shiny Western product packages and full store 
shelves, from images of conspicuous consumption in Western films and glossy magazine 
covers, from novels and other literary texts that figured subjects free to roam the world 
and explore their social settings. Was that what democracy was all about? What would it 
take for Czechoslovak society to move closer to a democratic future? Those were among 
the many questions that abounded in the aftermath of the revolution. In this sense, I 
suggest that the immediate aftermath of the Velvet revolution was a profoundly 
theoretical moment, an intense opportunity for competing imaginations to take form and 
come together. 
In this context Vaclav Havel emerged as a distinctive voice that not only 
responded to the ambiguities of the occasion but also put together a coherent vision for 
what democracy could mean and do for the Czechoslovak people and what it would take 
for them to bring democracy about. Havel was certainly not speaking in a vacuum. 
Democracy was not a concept that he invented. Democracy was indeed a foreign word, 
one whose roots could be traced to the core Western liberal philosophies. Yet, bringing 
democracy to Czechoslovakia was not a simple matter of translation. As this chapter aims 
to demonstrate, Havel articulated an original understanding and blueprint of 
democratization, one that deviated in significant ways from the dominant western models 
of transition. In my analysis of Havel's speeches, therefore, I do not attempt to offer a 
comprehensive reconstruction of his rhetorical response to the challenges of the 
transition. My task is more narrow. It is to recover and highlight those aspects of his 
democratization theory that challenge, and therefore should enrich, our intellectual 
imagination about what is a democracy and how it comes about. Specifically, I focus on 
how Havel approaches three aspects of democratization: the time of transition, the space 
of transition, and the agency of transition. In my analysis, I reference the speeches by 
paragraph number as identified in the Appendix. 
4.2. Constructing the Time of Transition 
As my literature revealed, current academic models present transition as a time- 
bound, linear process. This construction carries a simplistic notion of time-time is 
somehow outside of us, independent and unyielding. Rhetorical scholars, however, have 
long pointed to the lived, experiential qualities of time. Time is makes sense through 
narrative and mythic structures in discourse. At the core of these competing 
conceptualizations of time lies a more profound issue, namely a philosophical difference 
over the role of human culture in creating and constituting a reality. My attention to 
Have's rhetorical management of time, I suggest, should yield important clues for the 
democratization theorists as it would reveal the role that cultural resources such as myths 
and narratives play in moving society along toward a political transformation. Before I 
turn our attention to the way Havel's speeches manage time, let me elaborate on why I 
am attractive to a discursive approach to time instead of the linear model currently 
dominating the democratization literature. 
4.1.1. Myths and Narratives as Temporal Resources for  Transition 
The study of mythic narratives highlights that political communities and realities 
materialize through discourse. As such, the study of myth in political communication 
treats historical and cultural ideas as inherently tied to political processes, such as 
transition. Like many theoretical terms, the word myth has been hard to define. Ivan 
Strenski captures the plethora of contested and misused definitions when he states that 
"[Tlhere is no such "thing" as myth. Therearnay be the word "myth", but the word names 
numerous and conflicting "objects" of inquiry.. . ."" Although Strenski is right to point 
out the inconsistency in the use of the term, rhetorical scholars have identified several 
definitions of myth in the context of public discourse. Waldo Braden suggests that, 
"Myth draws on shared memory and imagination, [it] results from a collective experience 
over a considerable period of time, [it] represents an oversimplification of events, persons 
and relationships, [its] substance is more emotional than logical, and it combines reality 
and fiction."45 
In a less formal definition, Rushing and Frentz state that, "Myths are long- 
enduring stories . . . that dramatize a culture's deepest beliefs and  dilemma^."'^ Both 
definitions suggest that myth is a type of narrative that combines real and fictional 
elements. In myths in political speeches, certain aspects of history are accentuated while 
others are left unaddressed with the objective of creating a coherent narrative. Public 
narratives and myths help to connect the past, present, and future: "In order to govern the 
present and future, one also has to govern the past - the ways that preceding regimes, 
processes and events are remembered, interpreted and assessed."47 Moreover, by actively 
structuring their sense of time, myths and narratives help consolidate communities. The 
rhetorical construction of time, in other words, is a means by which national identity is 
formed and contextualized. For example, following the 1940 Soviet coup-d'etat of 
44 Ivan Strenski, Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth-Century History: Gassier; Eliade, Levi-Strauss, and 
Malinowski(1owa City, IA: University of Iowa Press), 1. 
45 Waldo W. Braden, "Myths in a Rhetorical Context," Southern Speech Communication Journal, no. 40 
(1975): 116. 
46 Janice H. Rushing and Tom S. Frentz, "The Mythic Perspective," in The Art of Rhetorical Criticism, ed. 
Jim A. Kuypers (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2004), 241. 
47 Tiiu Kreegipuu and Epp Lauk, "The 1940 Soviet Coup-d'Etat in the Estonian Communist Press: 
Constructing History to Reshape Collective Memory," Westminster Papers in Corn~LJniCation and 
Culture 4, no. 4 (2007): 42. 
Estonia, the Soviet Union sought to legitimize their power by creating official historical 
accounts of the occupied nation.48 As a part of this agenda, the so-called June Myth 
emerged, providing a rhetorical justification of the Soviet occupation. One of the most 
fascinating features of the June Myth was its formation of an imagined historical 
continuity. The June Myth treated the events of 1940 as a natural historical progression. 
Defining what a myth or public narrative is, however, is less important than 
acknowledging what it can do for a community, particularly for a community on the 
verge of profound change. In the context of public communication, scholars have agreed 
that the general purpose of public narratives and mythic references is to provide a 
problem-solving mechanism to address problems that cannot be solved solely on a 
rational basis.49 Rushing adds that oftentimes, myths even identify and construct the 
problem or crisis facing the a~dience.~' In this sense, myth can create a crisis and justify 
an intervention, or portray the current events as natural and suggest that no intervention is 
the best course of action. 
A more concrete and narrow function of mythic narratives is that they serve as 
models for social action. In that, a myth determines what constitutes a legitimate course 
of action. This encompasses many aspects of myth. Braden identifies a moral dimension 
of myth when he claims that the themes in myth construct virtues and vices, as to suggest 
what the audience ought to behave like." Rowland builds on the notion of a moralized 
48 Ibid. 
49 Robert C. Rowland, "On a Limited Approach to Mythic Criticism - Rowland's Rejoinder," 
Communication Studies 4 1, no. 2 (Summer 1990a): 153. 
50 Janice H. Rushing, "On Saving Mythic Criticism -A Reply to Rowland," COmm~niCatiOn Studies 41, 
no. 2 (Summer 1990): 138-139. 
5 1 Braden, "Myth in a Rhetorical Context," 125. 
discourse when he claims that in order to serve as a recommendation for future direction 
of society, the myth seeks to legitimize certain positions, and discard others.52 The notion 
of a good society thus lies at the core of myth. Consequently, myth contains both implicit 
and explicit directions regarding acceptable and unacceptable courses of action in 
response to the exigency of the rhetorical situation. As Bennett suggests, "The capacity of 
myth to structure political processes is demonstrated not only in the production of 
acceptable policy alternatives, but also in the generation of intolerance for political 
options that fall outside the range of myth-sanctioned choice."53 
Consequently, myth creates a space of plausible courses of action, and regards all 
other alternatives as impossible or unacceptable. The stigmatization of alternatives 
situated outside "the myth-sanctioned choice," does not have to be expressed in the text 
or speech itself. On the contrary, the power of the myth lies in the implicit connections 
and the symbols it carries. As such, it radically decreases the opportunity for opposition 
to attack the message of a mythic narrative with a rational argument." Furthermore, due 
to its roots in commonly held beliefs, myth presents the preferred course of action as one 
that is familiar, and surrounds other political alternatives with the fear of the unknown. 
Public narratives and myths are essentially time management tools; they are means by 
which communities make sense of their past, present, and future. I now turn to my 
analysis of the way Have1 mobilizes time for the sake of moving the Czechoslovak 
community toward democratization. 
52 Robert C. Rowland, "On Mythic Criticism," Communication Studies41, no. 2 (Summer 1990b): 102. 
53 Lance W. Bennett, "Myth, Ritual, and Political Control," Journal of Communication 30, (Autumn 
1980): 171. 
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4.1.2. Havel's Timing of Democratic Transition 
Both the 1990 and 1991 speeches by Havel reveal a reluctance to frame the 
transition as a linear process. Instead Havel utilized two different temporal frameworks to 
construct the present as a moment of intervention. In the 1990 Address, Havel refrained 
from applying a temporal framework to the future. Rather, he framed Czechoslovak 
history as discontinuous in order to construct the present moment - the end of the 
communist rule - as an open-ended opportunity for the society to come together and 
engage in creating a new political system and society. In contrast, the 1991 Address 
featured a narrative of a "delayed transition," as Havel claimed that the transition had not 
yet started. Overall, I argue that Havel's reluctance to engage in linear understandings of 
time served the purpose of maintaining the momentum of civil society engagement in 
political life. In other words, it was a way of mobilizing the community to make their 
own time. In the span of the two speeches, he achieved this result primarily by utilizing a 
triadic narrative which mobilized three distinct myths: a myth of a glorious past, a myth 
of a decline toward a degraded present, and a myth of regeneration through return to the 
glorious past. 55 56 
Havel's 1990 speech clearly compartmentalized Czech history into a glorious 
period before the totalitarian regime, a dark age during the four decades of the regime, 
and the hopeful present, providing Czechs and Slovaks with an opportunity to create a 
55 Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Lytle, "Myth and Mobilization: The Triadic Structure of 
Nationalist Rhetoric," Nations and Nationalism 7,  no.2, (2001): 176. 
56 Anthony D Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 63-69. 
grandiose fkture. In order to utilize the exigency of the recent Velvet Revolution to 
prepare a common ground on which the society can begin to build a democracy, Havel 
dramatized Czech history. In the speech, he divided Czech history into three distinct 
portions and attributes radically different characteristics to each of them. This is evident 
in the very beginning of the speech when Havel says, 
For forty years you heard from my predecessors on this day different variations 
on the same theme: how our country was flourishing . . . how happy we all were . 
. .. I assume you did not propose me for this office so that I, too, would lie to you. 
Our country is not flourishing. The enormous creative and spiritual potential of 
our nations is not being used sensibly.57 
Havel thus compartmentalized history into an era before the regime, in which 
many of the society's cultural resources were rooted, a period of the communist regime, 
where the society was told it was "flourishing" while it was in fact deteriorating and the 
present, which is articulated as an opportunity for significant political change. 
The 1990 Address narrated Czechoslovak history as one that has suffered a loss of 
moral purity. When offering an explanation for why the nation has found itself in a state 
of degradation, Havel clearly identifies the main cause of decline, "[A111 this is still not 
the main problem. The worst thing is that we live in a contaminated moral 
en~ironment."~' Morality and civic virtues were thus identified as the means by which the 
57 Vaclav Havel, "1990 New Year's Address to the Nation," (Prague Castle - Archive: Office of the 
accessed August 1,20 1 O), para. 1-3. 
58 Ibid., para. 6. 
society can successfully transition into a democracy. Additionally, the narrative implied 
that while the morality of the nation had been harmed by the regime, it had not been 
ruined completely. This argument was carried particularly by metaphors of "slumber" and 
"awakening," suggesting that the nation possessed the potential to successfully overcome 
the challenges ahead. For example, early in the 1990 address, Havel suggested that "The 
recent period - and in particular the last six weeks of our peaceful revolution - has shown 
the enormous human, moral and spiritual potential, and the civic culture that slumbered 
in our society under the enforced mask of apathy."59 Revolutions sparking dramatic 
regime changes are often characterized by a great degree of societal fragmentation and an 
omnipresent fear of the unfamiliar. Establishing that the culture possessed innate cultural 
resources that could be utilized in order to move to a better future mediated the fear of the 
unknown. 
Havel's narrative culminated in a plea for redemption associated with a prescribed 
idea of a utopian future. Having identified the manifestation of the loss of autonomy to be 
morality and civic virtue, Havel clearly articulated that the state the society had found 
itself in was reversable and could be undone, "We have to accept this legacy as a sin we 
committed against ourselves. If we accept it as such, we will understand that it is up to us 
all, and up to us alone, to do something about it."60 Havel also tasked the audience with 
the goal of embarking on this redemptive process by providing a notion of a utopian 
future that the nation ought to aspire to. 
I dream of a republic independent, free, and democratic, of a republic 
59 Ibid., para. 10. 
60 Ibid., para. 8. 
economically prosperous and yet socially just; in short, of a humane republic that 
serves the individual and that therefore holds the hope that the individual will 
serve it in turn. Of a republic of well-rounded people, because without such 
people it is impossible to solve any of our problems . . .. 6 1 
Hence, Havel created a notion of a shared future and a common goal to work 
towards, while emphasizing that the nation possessed sufficient cultural potential to 
achieve those goals. By equating the quest for a democratic society with a journey 
, 
towards moral purity, it began to be apparent what constitutes a legitimate as opposed to 
an illegitimate outcome of this process. In other words, by moralizing the mythic 
narrative, by imposing moral qualities to time itself, Havel implied that the means by 
which a transition was to be achieved had intrinsic value and ought to be managed with 
care and responsibility. In doing so he constrained the understanding of democratic 
transition as an end that could be achieved by just any means. As a result, Havel begins to 
outline that there are limitations in the process of moving forward, and that the process 
possesses a moral dimension, a dimension that would be expressed in the way he 
managed the timeframe of the transition. 
Havel's understanding of democratization as driven by the attainment of specific 
moral values rather than a focus on systems-change poses a challenge to existing 
democratization theory. He identified the source of legitimacy of the new system in 
socio-cultural values, of the community's understanding of its past and present, rather 
than in the validity of new institutional structures. Havel's approach and the socio- 
61 Ibid., para. 3 1. 
scientific approach to democratization are not mutually exclusive, for it is evident that he 
understood the necessity for re-structuring the political system after the fall of 
communism. However, his speeches illuminated that a society in transition did not 
perceive itself as either succeeding or failing against a strict set of system-driven criteria 
such as the rule of law or the adoption of a new constitution. Instead, the society in 
transition assessed the legitimacy and authenticity of the process by using psychological 
and spiritual indicators of content, rooted in socio-cultural ideas of what ought to 
constitute an alternative to communism. 
Furthermore, the focus on an open-ended future challenges the assumption that 
democratization literature makes regarding the presence of a pre-determined notion of 
democracy and a set of linear steps. In the 1990 New Year's Address, the temporal 
framework is applied to the society's past rather than its future. By grounding the present 
moment in historical terms, the transition was constructed not as an abstract process 
imposed from above or outside, but as a task that stemmed from within society and its 
cultural resources. The focus on understanding the present moment through a specific 
historical narrative allowed Havel to generate momentum and engagement on the side of 
civil society, rather than exacerbate the fears of the unknown. 
The 199 1 New Year's speech addressed the issue of timeline on the transition 
process and time-bound expectations for hture political developments. The temporal 
framework used in this speech had two characteristics. First, Havel's narrative placed the 
beginning of the transition not in the moment of the Velvet Revolution, but a year later - 
to the present moment of his 1991 speech. Second, Havel used the notion of 
democratization as a linear succession of concrete systems-driven tasks, and abandoned 
the moral determinants but refrains from identifying a concrete end-point for the process. 
I suggest that this rhetorical strategy legitimized the quest for freedom and secured the 
democratization process in the eyes of the citizens. 
The 199 1 New Year's Address discussed the concept of time with respect to the 
future of the transition. In this Address, Havel surprisingly constructs the upcoming year 
as the start of the actual transition (as opposed to the Revolution itself), "[Tlhe conditions 
for a new environment have been created."62 The idea of the first year as a devoid of 
governance confirms that there is no immediate ideological or structural trajectory for the 
country to follow. 
The timeline of transition departed from Western theoretical understanding of 
democratization. Havel framed the first year of post-communism as a diagnostic 
experience through which the society learned of the full effects of the communist regime. 
Only upon such understanding could it begin to re-build itself. "We are proceeding from 
the plans to the work of reconstruction itself."63 Havel announced that the society would 
only now begin to enact its idea of democracy. The idea of a "postponed transition" 
helped to maintain momentum and spark positive attitudes on the side of the citizenry. 
The first year of transition was very difficult for the country, and when striving to create a 
societal commitment to democracy, it would have been unwise for Havel to frame 
62 Vaclav Havel, "1991 New Year's Address to the Nation," (Prague Castle - Archive: Office of the 
President - Selected Speeches and Writings, 
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democracy as a regime of problems and disgruntlement. By insisting that building 
democracy would begin in 199 1, Havel opened the door to a democracy to be a more 
positive experience and a space of agency for the citizens. 
In the course of the 199 1 speech, Havel acknowledged that democratization 
required some specific system-driven tasks, "We shall actually begin building our new 
and democratic state and setting up its new economic system on the foundation of all 
these preconditions."64 Similar to the 1990 Address, Havel refrained from outlining a 
concrete systems-oriented vision as the objective of transition, "The old system 
collapsed, and a new one so far has not been built. Our social life is marked by a 
subliminal uncertainty over what kind of system we are going to build, how to build it, 
and whether we are able to build it at all."65 Although Havel moved away from framing 
the construction of democracy as a strictly moral task, he still did not treat the transition 
as a linear pre-determined process. 
Both speeches shared a positive outlook on the future. While the 1990 Address 
promised glorious future via the return to the golden age of the First Republic, the 1991 
Address presented a more sobering prediction of transition. Havel warned against a state 
of euphoria, and considered the building of a democracy to be a trial-and-error process. 
Therefore, 1991 was expected to be "a year of great trials."66  he progress of 
democratization could be assessed not merely through external measures such as 
evaluating the quality of rule of law, rather by the level of civil society investment in the 
process and their attitudes toward the changes. This is evident when Havel states, 
64 Ibid., para. 23. 
65 Ibid., para. 9. 
66 Ibid., para. 25. 
I am convinced that in my next address, the pleasant surprises will outnumber the 
unpleasant. I believe I will be able to announce that the reconstruction of our 
house has been successfully undertaken, and that its foundations are firmly laid in 
this land and its best  tradition^.^^ 
Havel thus concluded with a temporal expectation that the transition would produce more 
positive experiences of democratization, while emphasizing that a democratic tradition 
ought to not be seen or adopted as alien. 
4.2. Constructing the Space of Transition 
A second line of thought in Havel's speeches that I believe should enrich the 
available theoretical conceptualizations of democratization consists of the way in which 
he constructed the discursive space of the transition. Through both of his speeches, 
Havel identified the space in which transition from communism to democracy would 
occur. Traditionally, democratization literature suggests that transition occurs at the site 
of a geographically defined state through a re-structuring of institutions for the purposes 
of power distribution. However, according to Havel, democratization happens in the 
socio-cultural realm. Four decades of communist rule left deep traces in the spiritual 
landscape of the society at large, and hence any effort at an alternative political 
environment has to address the psycho-social condition of the society. This model of 
democratization as a socio-cultural process implies that the re-negotiation of human 
67 Ibid., para. 49. 
interactions and relationships within society constitutes a key component of political 
transformation. 
In the 1991 Address, Havel repeatedly referred to a house-themed metaphor in 
order to illustrate the nature of democratic transition. During the weeks following the 
Velvet Revolution, the fall of communism sparked a country-wide euphoria that allowed 
little space for assessing the scope of the communist legacy and its impact on establishing 
an alternative. Havel captured the societal feeling of disillusionment experienced in the 
first year after the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
We k n e i  that the house we inherited was not in good shape. The stucco was 
falling off in places, the roof looked rather dubious, and we had doubts about 
some other things as well. After a year of examination, we have discovered to our 
distress that all the piping is rusted, the beams are rotten, the wiring is badly 
damaged.68 
The house metaphor highlighted two dimensions of democratic transition - an exterior 
and an interior dimension. On the one hand, the exterior dimension referred to easily 
identifiable flaws of the repressive regime. For example, in the context of 
Czechoslovakia, it referenced the communist regime's suppression of the freedom of 
speech. The more self-evident injustices of the regime gave rise to resistance movements, 
such as for example the signing of Charter 77 that called for basic human rights in 
Czechoslovakia at the time. On the other hand, the interior dimension described aspects 
of a political environment that could not be easily defined in terms of legal violations or 
68 Ibid., para. 5 .  
grossly inequitable power distribution. The interior dimension includes psychological, 
social, and cultural values and beliefs that had been cultivated in a particular political 
environment. In the aftermath of communism, the effects of longstanding totalitarianism 
on the above mentioned spheres of society began to come to light. 
Havel's 1991 speech suggested that the interior and exterior dimensions of 
political transformation cannot be separated. The first post-communist year revealed the 
events that have occurred in the interior dimension, "We have discovered that what a year 
ago seemed to be a neglected house is essentially a ruin."69 The four decades of 
totalitarian rule had thoroughly damaged the interior core of society. Hence, a process of 
democratic transition could not be understood purely as a systems-change. In order to 
transform from a repressive regime, the connection between systems and society ought to 
be recognized. Building democracy was not just a matter of strengthening the rule of law, 
fostering an environment of individual rights, and ensuring free elections. Rather, 
democratization could be seen as a process of societal transformation, whereby systemic 
changes were certainly necessary, but the substance of the transformation occurred in the 
psycho-social realm of the citizenry. Havel's house analogy powerfully argued that the 
project of transition required specific system-building tasks, but that the ultimate task of 
building a democratic society remained much greater. Although connected, structural 
procedures could not fully account for the psychological, social, and cultural dynamics of 
society. Have1 allows us to understand democratization as a process of building a new 
psycho-social space, metaphorically as a process of building a home. 
69 Ibid., para. 6 .  
A sense of ownership transforms a house into a home. In other words, a societal 
engagement with the democratization process presented itself as a vehicle for transition, 
for society represented the embodiment of the psycho-social space that Havel's metaphor 
illustrated. The emphasis on building a relationship and ownership of the state becomes 
evident: "I appeal to all of you, Czechs and Slovaks, as well as members of other ethnic 
groups, to respect our new state, to treat it as one that is genuinely our own, and to bear in 
mind its general we1fa1-e."70 Havel aimed to inspire a certain type of civic culture, in 
which citizens would not treat the state primarily as a safeguard of rights but rather as a 
space through which a community of citizens could materialize. 
In addition, Havel insisted that a reconstruction of the metaphorical house must be 
holistic. The socio-cultural space of transition was intimately tied to systemic issues, 
"[R]egardless of how badly the house was damaged during the long years of [communist] 
rule, the house now belongs to us, and it is entirely up to us how we rebuild it."71 This 
view suggests that democratization occurred through societal transformation, and such 
transformation can only be effective in so far as citizens take ownership of the process. It 
is important, therefore, to take a closer look at Havel's theory of agency. 
4.3 Constructing the Agents of Transition 
As mentioned in the literature review, Eastern European transitions challenged 
comparative scholars to incorporate notions of civil society as one of the predicting 
factors of a successful democratization process. Through Havel's speeches, we learn of 
70 Ibid., para. 22. 
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two types of agency - collective agency, which can be defined as a society's ability to 
engage in political transformation, and the agency of individual citizens within a 
democratic society. 
4.3.1. Constructing Collective Agency 
At the brink of regime change, in his 1990 Address, Havel utilized a nation- 
centered narrative in order to highlight the societal capacity to take on the task of massive 
political transformation. General narratives of Czech history feature several periods that 
are identified with strife and glory. Havel filled his triadic mythic narrative with 
characters from these transitional periods in order to produce a cultural image of the 
capacity and agency from within society. Furthermore, this rhetoric portrayed transitions 
as not novel and unfamiliar, but rather as processes that had occurs throughout history. In 
light of identifying the collective agency in the transitional project as a whole, Havel 
defined what constituted the subjects and agents of transitions. 
One of Havel's tasks was to inspire citizens to embrace the notion of civil society. 
The national sense of separation from the government was largely embedded in an 
interpretation of history that treated Czechoslovakia as the object of global power 
politics. In order to counter the view of the nation as the object of international politics, 
as a community devoid of agency, Havel stated, "The enormous creative and spiritual 
potential of our nations is not being used sensibly."72 Further on in the 1991 speech, 
Havel downplayed the importance of international context in the Velvet Revolution when 
72 Havel, "New Year's Address - 1990", para. 4. 
he stated, "The fact that we enjoyed optimal international conditions does not mean that 
anyone else has directly helped us during the recent weeks. In fact, after hundreds of 
years, both our nations have raised their heads high of their own initiative without relying 
on the help of stronger nations or powers."73 Hence, to encourage a sense of collective 
empowe'rment, Have1 embarked on a search for inspirational precedents within the 
country's historical narratives. 
Cultural narratives deploy prescriptive messages of what ought to be done and 
who ought to act and national heroes often embody such messages. The rhetorical use of 
heroic characters demarcates the field of agency. Current scholarly work provides a 
prescriptive definition of a hero. Smith describes heroes as those who "[Plrovide models 
for virtuous conduct, their deeds of valor inspire faith and courage in their oppressed and 
decadent  descendant^."^^ Thus the literature seems to conclude that heroes in myths are 
courageous, possess physical strength, and are successful at conquests. Rowland 
establishes the presence of heroes as an essential component of myth, "[Tlhe main 
characters in myth must be heroic [. . .I. Characters of less stature could not solve the 
problems [. . .]. Only a great hero can conquer evil."?' As described above, the purpose of 
a myth is to identify and resolve a societal problem. However, mythic criticism provides 
us with a heroic notion that relies on military and physical power. If mythic heroes can 
only consist of successful military leaders, can myths only be effective in rhetorical 
situations that advocate for the use of power? By analyzing Havel's 1990 speech, we 
discover that the role of heroes in a mythic narrative is rather formulaic. In other words, 
73 Ibid., para. 14. 
74 Smith, Myths and Memories , 65 .  
75 Rowland, "On Mythic Criticism", 102. 
the characteristics possessed by the heroes act as models for the audience and the political 
positions they ought to adopt. 
Havel used references to non-violent characters from transitional periods of Czech 
history in order to illustrate a cultural capacity to undergo difficult socio-political 
transformations. In the 1990 Address, Havel made references to three characters from 
Czech history - Petr ChelEickf, Jan Amos Komenskf, and TomaS Garrigue Masaryk - all 
of whom were perceived as spiritual leaders, great educators, or persons with high moral 
values. All three of them were powerful actors when the Czech nation was undergoing 
dramatic transitions or resistance to ideology. Petr Chelcicky was a spiritual leader that 
promoted non-violence and community values during the Hussite Wars in the 1 5m 
century. The Hussite troops declared a violent revolt against Catholic ideology and 
injustice after Jan Hus, a leading Protestant figure, was burnt at the stake for his beliefs. 
Jan Amos Komensky, also called the "Teacher of Nations" constitutes a cultural symbol 
of literacy, progress, and national consciousness. Komensky lived during the suppression 
of the Prague Estates Rebellion and the Battle of White Mountain that resulted into the 
strengthening of Hapsburg Imperial rule over Czech lands. He, too, fought against the 
stifling ideology of the Catholic Church. Komensky pursued resistance (both in the 
Czech lands and later in Dutch exile) through writing pedagogical theory, and first 
illustrated textbooks. The third heroic character, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, symbolized a 
transition that parallels that of 1 989.76 
76 Ramet, Whose Democracy?, 18. 
Together, these three spiritual and non-violent historical characters project an 
image of non-violent agency. They share a moral approach to politics and thus embody 
virtue. As Havel cast their legacy, "Our first president wrote: 'Jesus, not Caesar.' In this 
he followed our philosophers Chelcicky and ~ o m e n s k ~ . " ~ ~  Chelcicky specifically has 
been described as a proponent of non-violence, and appraised in presidential writings 
during the era of the so-called First Republic (191 8-1938) which followed 
Czechoslovakia's peaceful secession from Austro-Hungarian empire. In The Meaning of 
Czech History, Masaryk writes, "I am fond of i i ika  . . . yet I must agree with ChelCickf 
that the violence which i i i ka  used should be avoided. My model is ChelCickf, a man as 
energetic as i i ika,  but free of violence."78 
Masaryk contrasts i i ika,  a military leader during the time of the Protestant 
Reformation, with ChelEickf, clearly delineating that famous historical characters can 
hold the same beliefs but achieve them by non-violent means. By selecting references to 
non-violent characters from troubling historical periods, Havel made it possible to the 
audience to accept the feasibility of non-violence even at the times of greatest struggle. 
The three heroes mentioned throughout Havel's 1990 address had long been a part 
of Czech nationalist discourse, and thus their re-appearance in Havel's speech reinforced 
the triadic narrative of glorious past, and a renegade present to be followed by a future 
reinstatement of the glorious past. It is important note that ChelCickf and Komenskf were 
used as symbolically-laden references by Masaryk, the first president of independent 
77 Havel, "New Year's Address - 1990," para. 17. 
78 Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History, trans. Rene Wellek (Chapel Hill, NC: 
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Czechoslovakia. Masaryk situates these historical figures into a heroic narrative, and lays 
the groundwork for understanding transition as a cultural phenomenon, "[Flree thinking 
in Bohemia naturally had its roots in the Czech reformation. . .. As soon as the small 
group of Brethren . . . was granted tolerance, Komenskf's Labyrint svEta (The Labyrinth 
of the World) was amongst the first books to be published."79 
ChelCicky and Komenskf are thus strongly associated with the beginnings of Czech 
national revival. Both of them symbolize national revival through education, literacy, and 
spirituality. The fact that Masaryk has mentioned them in his writings and speeches, and 
the two characters are now invoked by Havel along with Masaryk, forms the idea that 
virtuous leadership and citizenship have existed in Czech and Slovak cultures for 
centuries and are to be inherited by the current generation. 
Havel's construction of heroes in times of transition or oppressive ideology serves 
to familiarize the experience of social and political transformation. By establishing that 
transitions were not a novel phenomenon for Czechoslovakia and by emphasizing 
personified examples of non-violent resistance, Havel created a sense of confidence, 
agency, and manageability of the otherwise unfamiliar events following the fall of 
communism in 1989. Havel's reach into the discursive resources of the community 
helped construct the people of Czechoslovakia as a resilient culture of transition. 
79 Ibid., 21. 
4.3.2. Constructing I ndividual Agency 
Traditionally, democratization theory emphasizes the restoration of the state as 
the provider and safeguard of individual rights. Democratization theory projects a strong 
notion of the individual citizen and their rights and responsibilities within the legal 
framework of the state. In contrast, Havel's 199 1 Address offered a definition of what 
constituted a citizen as an agent within a socio-cultural space of transition rather than a 
strictly systems-oriented one. 
Havel identified the state not as a mere safeguard of rights and an environment for 
civic competition, 
Let us teach ourselves and others that politics should be an expression of a desire 
to contribute to the happiness of the community rather than of a need to cheat or 
rape the community. Let us teach ourselves and others that politics can be not 
simply the art of the possible, especially if this means the art of speculation, 
calculation, intrigue, secret deals and pragmatic maneuvering, but that it can also 
be the art of the impossible, that is, the art of improving ourselves and the world.80 
For Havel the realm of transition extended into the social, spiritual, and cultural 
layers of society. Thus, the idea of the state as a space that does not serve only as a 
platform for competitive interests, but rather an environment for community to abide by 
moral codes, informs his notion of who constitutes a citizen. 
80 Havel, "New Year's Address - 1 9907', para 18. 
Havel's definition of a citizen resonated with the idea of a moral state. According 
to Havel, a citizen ought to live in solidarity with other citizens, and make decisions not 
on the basis of the maximum profit that the current economic and legal circumstances 
allowed, but with a society's best interests in mind. "[Mlany of us [. . .] [forget] that the 
welfare of individuals or groups is possible only against the background of the general 
we~fare."~' This further builds on Havel's idea that democratization is a process that 
happens in the psycho-social space of a community, and not simply in the realm of 
systems, institutions, and procedures. Havel defended a conception of the citizen as one 
who is motivated to act in solidarity with others to transform many aspects of public life. 
Havel suggested that it ought to inform the type of work people engage in, "I appeal to all 
those who . . . create things of value for the entire society. . . . I urge all of you who 
quickly succeed in finding your place within the new economic system to sympathize 
with those who are not, initially, as lucky, and to help them as much as possible."82 
Hence, for Havel the citizens' agency was not limited by the state, but negotiated through 
the social sphere by adopting community-oriented cultural values. Havel endorsed types 
of citizen action that benefitted others rather than those strictly motivated by individual 
gain. Thus, he departed from traditional models of liberal democracy that give primacy to 
individualism, and instead envisioned the populace as a group of citizens interconnected 
through concern for each other and the general welfare. 
My attention to Havel's construction of the time, space, and agents of 
democratization reveal a dynamic and culturally grounded conception of what it takes to 
8 1 Havel, "New Year's Address - 199 l", para. 9. 
82 Ibid., para. 26. 
move a society through a process of transition. Have1 defies key postulations of the socio- 
scientific models of transition. Attention to the role of public discourse in the course of 
democratization allows us to discover plenty of valuable tools for approaching other 
cases. More importantly, though, I believe that it demonstrates that culture is a powerful 
engine, but also a powerful limit to social transformation. Thus, my case study of Havel's 
rhetorical approach to Czechoslovakia's transition should also stand as a warning to the 
current socio-scientific literature that no model of democratization which is devoid of 
attention to a society's rhetorical and cultural resources could work as a "fit one, fit all" 
script for transition toward a democracy. 
C H APT E R 5. Conclusion 
There is much at stake during a transition from a non-democratic to a democratic 
regime - people's physical safety, regional security, economic stability, and not the least, 
people's collective sense of identity and emotional well-being. How do the subjects of 
transition navigate and make sense of it all? Although democratization has been studied 
widely across a range of academic disciplines, little research has been conducted to 
examine the ideation of democracy and the socio-cultural resources available to societies 
experiencing a revolutionary period. In order to understand how societies themselves can 
be resilient in the face of major political change, this thesis insists that scholars ought to 
pay attention to how societies in transition understand and what they expect from 
democratic rule and the democratization processes. 
In this thesis, I approached former Czechoslovakia as a case study to examine 
discourses of democracy and democratization. The Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the 
following transition from a totalitarian regime are often cited as an example of peaceful 
transition. Yet, the rhetorical response to those challenges had been understudied and 
underappreciated. The challenges that President Havel faced at that moment were 
manifold - reconciling a troubling past of an oppressive regime, introducing democratic 
ideas, and establishing a sense of certainty, at perhaps one of the most uncertain times in 
Czechoslovak history. In response, Havel offered a sweeping and original line of thought 
on what it takes and what it means for a society to democratize. Thus, by recovering 
Havel's theory of democratization, this thesis aimed to recover the lived experience of 
transition and assess its implications for academic democratization models. 
My attention to the discursive constitution of democratization aimed to challenge 
the currently uncontested meanings of democracy in the democratization scholarship. A 
close textual analysis of Vaclav Havel's visionary speeches in the initial year of 
democracy in former Czechoslovakia reveals that democratization theory has much to 
gain from voices like Havels, voices that emerge from and speak to those undergoing a 
period of transition. My study shows that Havel's narrative departs from democratization 
theory in three major ways: in the way it conceives the time of transition, the space of 
transition, and the agents of transition. 
First, Havel's temporal understanding of transition contradicts the linear temporal 
framework present throughout democratization scholarship. The 1990 Address positions 
the Velvet Revolution within a historical narrative which portrays democracy as a natural 
development and totalitarianism as an historical aberration. By refusing to posit a specific 
goal for what a democracy should look like, the 1991 Address defended an open-ended 
approach to democratization. He allowed democratization to unfold more organically 
through the interplay of local imaginations, desires, and needs. 
Second, most scholars situate transition within the realm of the state and its 
bureaucratic and institutional systems. In contrast, Havel locates democratization within 
society itself. Using a house metaphor, Havel identifies the psycho-social and cultural 
sphere of society as the key environment in which democracy can be conceived and 
nurtured. Transition activities would become legitimate only when society took 
ownership of this environment and guarded and cared for it as their own. 
Third, Havel understands democratic society not merely as a collection of citizens 
that exercise their institutionalized rights and organize in the realm of civil society. 
Building a new democracy includes the task of constructing new forms of civic agency. 
Should such civic agency be imagined through the prism of individual rights as western 
liberal models seem to suggest? For Have1 the answer is no. Societies possess cultural 
resources through which they can understand themselves as collective agents of 
transition. Hence his vision contains a powerful message of democratic culture as an 
environment of general welfare where individualist concerns should be mediated by 
concerns for the society at large. 
These findings illuminate the price we pay for methodological blind spots in 
democratization theory. The scholarly focus on rationality and predictability has 
prevented us from accessing the most powerful (and ironically the least predictable) 
aspect of democratization - its human dimension. This study excavated the cultural and 
historical resources utilized during political transformation. Thus it challenged the 
secondary role of cultural context in many comparative and socio-scientific studies of 
democratization. Transitional theorists have been fascinated with constructing models of 
systems-change in hopes of extracting "lessons learned" for newly emerging 
democracies. However, these theories, primarily originating in Western scholarship, 
.contain a hint of hypocrisy. They aim to discover "lessons learned" for other countries, 
and in doing so disregard the potential challenge, critiques, and ideas each instance of 
democratization poses to Western liberal democratic thought. 
By recovering one of many voices that emerged fi-om the experience of 
communism, this project brings a lived dimension into the study of democratization. 
Subsequently, it aims to create a new line for scholarly dialogue and debate on 
democratization issues by freeing itself from social scientific models, and focusing 
closely on discourse as a point of entry into socio-cultural experiences. Attending to the 
discursive dimensions of democratization allows us to abandon polarized understandings 
of countries either succeeding or failing at democratization. For example, we can refuse 
to treat Northern African and Middle Eastern revolutions as an opportunity for them to 
grow by learning to institutionally and socially resemble the West. Instead, their newly 
acquired freedom forms a point of conversation between previously separated 
li 
experiences and voices; it creates a platform through which new ideas may come to light. 
For some scholars, post-communist countries constitute a closed case. Indeed, 
from a system-oriented perspective, the contemporary democratic states in Central and 
Eastern Europe resemble their Western counterparts. However, I argue that we should not 
close our eyes when a country's system reaches our cognitive expectations. Instead, we 
ought to ask ourselves, "How is their journey toward freedom and living out freedom 
different from ours and what can we learn from them?" By posing this question, we build 
an environment of reciprocal scholarship, where democratization is not studied for the 
sake of transition, but for the sake of multiplying and enriching our opportunities to make 
the world more free, more just, more equitable, and more intimate. 
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APENDIX  A. 
Vaclav Havel's New Year's Address t o  the Nation 
January lSt, 1990, Prague 
1. My dear fellow citizens, For forty years you heard from my predecessors on this 
day different variations on the same theme: how our country was flourishing, how many 
million tons of steel we produced, how happy we all were, how we trusted our 
government, and what bright perspectives were unfolding in front of us. 
2. I assume you did not propose me for this office so that I, too, would lie to you. 
3. Our country is not flourishing. The enormous creative and spiritual potential of 
our nations is not being used sensibly. Entire branches of industry are producing goods 
that are of no interest to anyone, while we are lacking the things we need. A state which 
calls itself a workers' state humiliates and exploits workers. Our obsolete economy is 
wasting the little energy we have available. A country that once could be proud of the 
educational level of its citizens spends so little on education that it ranks today as 
seventy-second in the world. We have polluted the soil, rivers and forests bequeathed to 
us by our ancestors, and we have today the most contaminated environment in Europe. 
Adults in our country die earlier than in most other European countries. 
4. Allow me a small personal observation. When I flew recently to Bratislava, I 
found some time during discussions to look out of the plane window. I saw the industrial 
complex of Slovnaft chemical factory and the giant Petr'alka housing estate right behind 
it. The view was enough for me to understand that for decades our statesmen and political 
leaders did not look or did not want to look out of the windows of their planes. No study 
of statistics available to me would enable me to understand faster and better the situation 
in which we find ourselves. 
5. But all this is still not the main problem. The worst thing is that we live in a 
contaminated moral environment. We fell morally ill because we became used to saying 
something different from what we thought. We learned not to believe in anything, to 
ignore one another, to care only about ourselves. Concepts such as love, friendship, 
compassion, humility or forgiveness lost their depth and dimension, and for many of us 
they represented only psychological peculiarities, or they resembled gone-astray 
greetings from ancient times, a little ridiculous in the era of computers and spaceships. 
Only a few of us were able to cry out loudly that the powers that be should not be all- 
powerful and that the special farms, which produced ecologically pure and top-quality 
food just for them, should send their produce to schools, children's homes and hospitals if 
our agriculture was unable to offer them to all. 
6 .  The previous regime - armed with its arrogant and intolerant ideology - reduced 
man to a force of production, and nature to a tool of production. In this it attacked both 
their very substance and their mutual relationship. It reduced gifted and autonomous 
people, skillfully working in their own country, to the nuts and bolts of some monstrously 
huge, noisy and stinking machine, whose real meaning was not clear to anyone. It could 
not do more than slowly but inexorably wear out itself and all its nuts and bolts. 
7. When I talk about the contaminated moral atmosphere, I am not talking just about 
the gentlemen who eat organic vegetables and do not look out of the plane windows. I am 
talking about all of us. We had all become used to the totalitarian system and accepted it 
as an unchangeable fact and thus helped to perpetuate it. In other words, we are all - 
though naturally to differing extents - responsible for the operation of the totalitarian 
machinery. None of us is just its victim. We are all also its co-creators. 
8. Why do I say this? It would be very unreasonable to understand the sad legacy of 
the last forty years as something alien, which some distant relative bequeathed to us. On 
the contrary, we have to accept this legacy as a sin we committed against ourselves. If we 
accept it as such, we will understand that it is up to us all, and up to us alone to do 
something about it. We cannot blame the previous rulers for everything, not only because 
it would be untrue, but also because it would blunt the duty that each of us faces today: 
namely, the obligation to act independently, freely, reasonably and quickly. Let us not be 
mistaken: the best government in the world, the best parliament and the best president, 
cannot achieve much on their own. And it would be wrong to expect a general remedy 
from them alone. Freedom and democracy include participation and therefore 
responsibility from us all. 
9. If we realize this, then all the horrors that the new Czechoslovak democracy 
inherited will cease to appear so terrible. If we realize this, hope will return to our hearts. 
10. In the effort to rectify matters of common concern, we have something to lean on. 
The recent period - and in particular the last six weeks of our peaceful revolution - has 
shown the enormous human, moral and spiritual potential, and the civic culture that 
slumbered in our society under the enforced mask of apathy. Whenever someone 
categorically claimed that we were this or that, I always objected that society is a very 
mysterious creature and that it is unwise to trust only the face it presents to you. I am 
happy that I was not mistaken. Everywhere in the world people wonder where those 
meek, humiliated, skeptical and seemingly cynical citizens of Czechoslovakia found the 
marvelous strength to shake the totalitarian yoke from their shoulders in several weeks, 
and in a decent and peaceful way. And let us ask: Where did the young people who never 
knew another system get their desire for truth, their love of free thought, their political 
ideas, their civic courage and civic prudence? How did it happen that their parents -- the 
very generation that had been considered lost --joined them? How is it that so many 
people immediately knew what to do and none needed any advice or instruction? 
1 1. I think there are two main reasons for the hopeful face of our present situation. 
First of all, people are never just a product of the external world; they are also able to 
relate themselves to something superior, however systematically the external world tries 
to kill that ability in them. Secondly, the humanistic and democratic traditions, about 
which there had been so much idle talk, did after all slumber in the unconsciousness of 
our nations and ethnic minorities, and were inconspicuously passed from one generation 
to another, so that each of us could discover them at the right time and transform them 
into deeds. 
12. We had to pay, however, for our present freedom. Many citizens perished in jails 
in the 1950s, many were executed, thousands of human lives were destroyed, hundreds of 
thousands of talented people were forced to leave the country. Those who defended the 
honor of our nations during the Second World War, those who rebelled against 
totalitarian rule and those who simply managed to remain themselves and think freely, 
were all persecuted. We should not forget any of those who paid for our present freedom 
in one way or another. Independent courts should impartially consider the possible guilt 
of those who were responsible for the persecutions, so that the truth about.our recent past 
might be fully revealed. 
13. We must also bear in mind that other nations have paid even more dearly for their 
present freedom, and that indirectly they have also paid for ours. The rivers of blood that 
have flowed in Hungary, Poland, Germany and recently in such a horrific manner in 
Romania, as well as the sea of blood shed by the nations of the Soviet Union, must not be 
forgotten. First of all because all human suffering concerns every other human being. But 
more than this, they must also not be forgotten because it is these great sacrifices that 
form the tragic background of today's freedom or the gradual emancipation of the nations 
of the Soviet Bloc, and thus the background of our own newfound freedom. Without the 
changes in the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic, 
what has happened in our country would have scarcely happened. And if it did, it 
certainly would not have followed such a peaceful course. 
14. The fact that we enjoyed optimal international conditions does not mean that 
anyone else has directly helped us during the recent weeks. In fact, after hundreds of 
years, both our nations have raised their heads high of their own initiative without relying 
on the help of stronger nations or powers. It seems to me that this constitutes the great 
moral asset of the present moment. This moment holds within itself the hope that in the 
future we will no longer suffer from the complex of those who must always express their 
gratitude to somebody. It now depends only on us whether this hope will be realized and 
whether our civic, national, and political self-confidence will be awakened in a 
historically new way. 
15. Self-confidence is not pride. Just the contrary: only a person or a nation that is 
self-confident, in the best sense of the word, is capable of listening to others, accepting 
them as equals, forgiving its enemies and regretting its own guilt. Let us try to introduce 
this kind of self-confidence into the life of our community and, as nations, into our 
behavior on the international stage. Only thus can we restore our self-respect and our 
respect for one another as well as the respect of other nations. 
16. Our state should never again be an appendage or a poor relative of anyone else. It 
is true that we must accept and learn many things from others, but we must do this in the 
future as their equal partners, who also have something to offer. 
17. Our first president wrote: "Jesus, not Caesar." In this he followed our 
philosophers Chelcicky and Komensky. I dare to say that we may even have an 
opportunity to spread this idea further and introduce a new element into European and 
global politics. Our country, if that is what we want, can now permanently radiate love, 
understanding, the power of the spirit and of ideas. It is precisely this glow that we can 
offer as our specific contribution to international politics. 
* 
18. Masaryk based his politics on morality. Let us try, in a new time and in a new 
way, to restore this concept of politics. Let us teach ourselves and others that politics 
should be an expression of a desire to contribute to the happiness of the community rather 
than of a need to cheat or rape the community. Let us teach ourselves and others that 
politics can be not simply the art of the possible, especially if this means the art of 
speculation, calculation, intrigue, secret deals and pragmatic maneuvering, but that it can 
also be the art of the impossible, that is, the art of improving ourselves and the world. 
19. We are a small country, yet at one time we were the spiritual crossroads of 
Europe. Is there a reason why we could not again become one? Would it not be another 
asset with which to repay the help of others that we are going to need? 
20. Our homegrown Mafia, those who do not look out of the plane windows and who 
eat specially fed pigs, may still be around and at times may muddy the waters, but they 
are no longer our main enemy. Even less so is our main enemy any kind of international 
Mafia. Our main enemy today is our own bad traits: indifference to the common good, 
vanity, personal ambition, selfishness, and rivalry. The main struggle will have to be 
fought on this field. 
2 1. There are free elections and an election campaign ahead of us. Let us not allow 
this struggle to dirty the so-far clean face of our gentle revolution. Let us not allow the 
sympathies of the world, which we have won so fast, to be equally rapidly lost through 
our becoming entangled in the jungle of skirmishes for power. Let us not allow the desire 
to serve oneself to bloom once again under the stately garb of the desire to serve the 
common good. It is not really important now which party, club or group prevails in the 
elections. The important thing is that the winners will be the best of us, in the moral, 
civic, political and professional sense, regardless of their political affiliations. The future 
policies and prestige of our state will depend on the personalities we select, and later, 
elect to our representative bodies. 
22. My dear fellow citizens! 
23. Three days ago I became the president of the republic as a consequence of your 
will, expressed through the deputies of the Federal Assembly. You have a right to expect 
me to mention the tasks I see before me as president. 
24. The first of these is to use all my power and influence to ensure that we soon step 
up to the ballot boxes in a free election, and that our path toward this historic milestone 
will be dignified and peaceful. 
25. My second task is to guarantee that we approach these elections as two self- 
governing nations who respect each other's interests, national identity, religious 
traditions, and symbols. As a Czech who has given his presidential oath to an important 
Slovak who is personally close to him, I feel a special obligation -- after the bitter 
experiences that Slovaks had in the past -- to see that all the interests of the Slovak nation 
are respected and that no state office, including the highest one, will ever be barred to it 
in the future. 
26. My third task is to support everything that will lead to better circumstances for 
our children, the elderly, women, the sick, the hardworking laborers, the national 
minorities and all citizens who are for any reason worse off than others. High-quality 
food or hospitals must no longer be a prerogative of the powerful; they must be available 
to those who need them the most. 
27. As supreme commander of the armed forces I want to guarantee that the defensive 
capability of our country will no longer be used as a pretext for anyone to stand in the 
way of courageous peace initiatives, the reduction of military service, the establishment 
of alternative military service and the overall humanization of military life. 
28. In our country there are many prisoners who, though they may have committed 
serious crimes and have been punished for them, have had to submit -- despite the 
goodwill of some investigators, judges and above all defense lawyers -- to a debased 
judiciary process that curtailed their rights. They now have to live in prisons that do not 
strive to awaken the better qualities contained in every person, but rather humiliate them 
and destroy them physically and mentally. In a view of this fact, I have decided to declare 
a relatively extensive amnesty. At the same time I call on the prisoners to understand that 
forty years of unjust investigations, trials and imprisonments cannot be put right 
overnight, and to understand that the changes that are being speedily prepared still require 
time to implement. By rebelling, the prisoners would help neither society nor themselves. 
I also call on the public not to fear the prisoners once they are released, not to make their 
lives difficult, to help them, in the Christian spirit, after their return among us to find 
within themselves that which jails could not find in them: the capacity to repent and the 
desire to live a respectable life. 
29. My honorable task is to strengthen the authority of our country in the world. I 
would be glad if other states respected us for showing understanding, tolerance and love 
for peace. I would be happy if Pope John Paul I1 and the Dalai Lama of Tibet could visit 
our country before the elections, if only for a day. I would be happy if our friendly 
relations with all nations were strengthened. I would be happy if we succeeded before the 
elections in establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Israel. I would also 
like to contribute to peace by briefly visiting our close neighbors, the German Democratic 
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Neither shall I forget our other neighbors 
-- fraternal Poland and the ever-closer countries of Hungary and Austria. 
30. In conclusion, I would like to say that I want to be a president who will speak less 
and work more. To be a president who will not only look out of the windows of his 
airplane but who, first and foremost, will always be present among his fellow citizens and 
listen to them well. 
3 1. You may ask what kind of republic I dream of. Let me reply: I dream of a 
republic independent, free, and democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and 
yet socially just; in short, of a humane republic that serves the individual and that 
therefore holds the hope that the individual will serve it in turn. Of a republic of well- 
rounded people, because without such people it is impossible to solve any of our 
problems -- human, economic, ecological, social, or political. 
32. The most distinguished of my predecessors opened his first speech with a 
quotation from the great Czech educator Komensky. Allow me to conclude my first 
speech with my own paraphrase of the same statement: 
33. People, your government has returned to you! 
APENDIX  B. 
Vaclav Havel's New Year's Address to  the Nation 
January lSt, 1991, Prague 
1. Dear fellow citizens, There used to be a time when this country's president could 
have delivered the same New Year's Address he had given a year before, and nobody 
would have noticed. 
Fortunately, that time has passed. 
2. Time and history have reentered our lives. The bleak skies of dullness and 
paralyzing inaction have cleared up. And we cannot help but be astonished at the range of 
possibilities emerging in a truly free political climate, and how it can always produce 
fresh surprises for us, in the good as well as the bad sense of the word. 
3. Allow me to mention first all the unpleasant surprises the past year has brought 
US. 
4. Primarily, it has become clear that the legacy of the past decades we have to cope 
with is even worse than we anticipated or could anticipate in the joyful atmosphere of 
those first weeks of freedom. New problems are emerging day by day, and we can see 
how interconnected they are, how long it takes to solve them, and how difficult it is to 
establish priorities. 
5.  We knew that the house we had inherited was not in good shape. The stucco was 
falling off in places, the roof looked rather dubious, and we had doubts about some other 
things as well. After a year of examination, we have discovered to our distress that all the 
piping is rusted, the beams are rotten, the wiring is badly damaged. We know that the 
reconstruction already planned and anticipated, will take much longer and be much more 
expensive than we originally believed. 
6 .  We have discovered that what a year ago seemed to be a neglected house is 
essentially a ruin. 
7. This is not a pleasant fact, and it is not surprising that all of us are rather annoyed 
and disappointed about it. Many citizens ask themselves why it is so difficult to come to 
terms with our past, to rehabilitate its victims, to remedy wrongdoing and bring in a just 
verdict against all those who are guilty. Many people wonder why the rulers of the past 
regime who have grown rich at the expense of society are still on top, and why they are 
so successful at making themselves at home under the new conditions. Many citizens 
wonder why the wide-ranging transformation of the entire Czechoslovak economy is still 
only being spoken about, and why, in their everyday lives, they can see no changes for 
the better. People are nervous because the only thing the planned reform has brought 
them so far are higher prices and the danger of losing their social security, and their jobs. 
We all are uneasy about the significant increase in crime. Hope for a better future is ever 
more obviously intermingled with the opposite feeling: fear of the future. 
8. In an atmosphere of general impatience, nervousness, disappointment and doubt, 
elements of malice, suspicion, mistrust and mutual accusation are insinuating themselves 
into public life. Surprisingly, freedom has given vent to a number of bad feelings and 
shown the depth of moral decline in our souls. We have defeated the monolithic, visible 
and obvious enemy and now -- driven by our dissatisfaction and by the need to find a 
living culprit -- we are searching for enemies in each other. We feel disappointed or even 
that we are letting each other down. 
9. A year ago, we all were united in the joy over having broken free of 
totalitarianism. Today we all are made somewhat nervous by the burden of freedom. Our 
society is still in a state of shock. This shock could have been expected, but none of us 
expected it to be so profound. The old system collapsed, and a new one so far has not 
I 
been built. Our social life is marked by a subliminal uncertainty over what kind of system 
we are going to build, how to build it, and whether we are able to build it at all. The 
feeling that the horizon of the new order is distant, dim and indefinite means that many of 
us cling to partial and substitute horizons, forgetting that the welfare of individuals or 
groups is possible only against the background of the general welfare. 
10. The unpleasant surprise of 1990 is thus the rather embarrassed, if not suffocating 
atmosphere we felt at the close of that year. 
1 1. Because of this atmosphere, we all are inclined to forget the several great and 
positive surprises of the first year following our rebellion against the totalitarian regime. I 
think that it is my duty today to remind you as well of the good things that have 
happened, accomplishments that a year ago we could scarcely have imagined. 
12. 1) The last units of the Soviet Army, which occupied our country twenty-two 
years ago, are leaving Czechoslovakia. 
13. 2) We have successfully held the first free elections in forty- two years and 
elected representatives to legislative bodies at all levels. 
14. 3) Our parliaments have enacted dozens of new bills, which create the first 
foundations of a truly legal, democratic and decentralized state. 
15. 4) We have gained the respect of the whole world again, after long decades, as an 
independent and democratic state. Our country is taken seriously and is visited by the 
most prominent world statesmen, who highly appreciate its foreign policy initiatives, 
aimed at building a new and peaceful Europe. 
16. 5) Full freedom of speech and expression prevails in our country, and freedom of 
assembly and association is guaranteed. 
17. 6) We have tom down the barbed wire that had surrounded our republic and made 
it one big concentration camp. Anyone can travel anywhere, and anyone can come to this 
country. 
18. 7) Religious life has resumed. Bishops have been appointed in all the Catholic 
episcopates. The Pope has visited our country, and we have established diplomatic 
relations with the Vatican. 
19. 8) After difficult discussions, we have managed to work out a plan of economic 
reform and to adopt some significant economic laws, which will form the legal 
framework for this reform. Today, our reform is being launched. 
20. 9) We have begun to form a true and viable federation. The first and probably 
most dramatic stage of this formation culminated in a recently adopted constitutional law, 
which divides executive powers between the two constituent republics and the federation. 
21. Clearly, much more has been accomplished in a single year than was done over 
the past forty-two years. 
22. I know we have still done very little, and that the main tasks still lie ahead of us. I 
would say that we have just completed a year of preparation in which the conditions for a 
new environment have been created. 
23. In the year that begins today, we shall start filling this environment with new 
substance. We shall actually begin building our new and democratic state and setting up 
its new economic system on the foundation of all these preconditions. 
24. We are proceeding from the plans to the work of reconstruction itself. 
25. I will not conceal from you that 1991 will be a year of great trials. We shall start 
implementing what we prepared last year. We shall begin to see whether it works and 
whether we are really capable of making the sacrifices we have so far spoken about only 
theoretically, but without which the large-scale transformations we have decided to make 
cannot be brought about. 
26. None of the new representatives of our state are calling for these sacrifices 
because they wish their fellow citizens to suffer. All of them are thinking of ways to 
reduce these sacrifices to an unavoidable minimum. We all know, however, that 
sacrifices are necessary, and that there is no other alternative. The former system has 
collapsed not only in our country but in the whole former Soviet Bloc, and along with it, 
the system of our foreign economic relations is also collapsing. Even if we wanted to 
keep the former unsuccessful centralized economic system going, we could not do so, 
simply because the environment in which that system could survive and of which it was 
an integral part has itself disappeared. 
27. Let me now try to sum up and give an approximate time schedule for the main 
tasks facing us this year. 
28. 1) By the end of the year at the latest, our parliaments should have adopted three 
new constitutions -- two for the constituent republics and one for the federal state. These 
constitutions should form a logical triangle, which would become a solid and durable 
basis for our entire new legal order. If the legislatures are successful in doing this, they 
will have fulfilled the main task that you, the voters, entrusted them with for their two- 
year term in office. These constitutions should also give the final shape to our 
constitutional arrangements. In my opinion, until they are enacted, some provisional laws 
must be adopted to provide a constitutional method of settling the crises that might occur 
during this difficult period of time. 
29. 2) Under the small-business privatization law, auctions are ready to be launched 
this month. Small-business privatization, like the restitution of confiscated property, 
could, in my estimate, also be completed in the coming year. Large, inflexible and 
bureaucratic organizations in the trade and service sector, as well as smaller production 
units, should be dismantled and replaced by a wide network of private and fully 
independent businesses. 
30. 3) Along with small-business privatization, the privatization of large factories and 
plants is to begin. This will apparently require several years to complete. At the end of 
this process, all property ownership, including that of land, other real estate and the 
means of production, should have been devolved to particular, clearly defined and fully 
independent owners. 
3 1. 4) As you know, a comparatively free price-setting process is beginning today, 
one of the conditions of a true marketplace. Price liberalization will probably bring about 
a rapid rise in prices. According to expert projections, price levels are expected to 
stabilize in the second half of the year. Price deregulation also involves the domestic, or 
partial, convertibility of the crown, the first step on the long and difficult path toward true 
and full convertibility. Despite anti-inflationary measures, inflation is also expected to 
grow in the first half of the year. This, too, is one of the costs of our reform process. In 
my opinion, in the first half of the year, it will be necessary to further clarifjr the 
legislative conditions to promote enterprise so that foreign investors will not lose interest 
in doing business in this country. So far, they have been impeded both by unspecified 
property ownership and by the vague legal framework that exists for foreign enterprise in 
our country. 
32. 5) Along with these initial steps, a clear strategic conception should emerge at the 
government level in two areas; first in the social sector, where it is necessary to create 
promptly, in cooperation with trade unions, a safety net of legislative and administrative 
measures to forestall the unjust and inhumane consequences of economic reform; and 
secondly, in the structure and orientation of energy production and large-scale industries. 
In this matter, no clear-cut decisions have been taken so far and, under the present 
circumstances, we cannot rely on the emerging marketplace to solve all the government's 
tasks. Such a conception also must take into account the major environmental 
requirements. 
33. 6) I firmly believe that in 1991 the Federal Assembly will discuss and adopt good 
and just laws that will clarify the future situation of farmers, and of agriculture in general. 
34. 7) In a year, our country will gradually start preparing for new parliamentary 
elections. I am convinced that within this year the spectrum of political forces in our 
country will stabilize. I hope that in the next elections we shall elect our representatives, 
with a better electoral law, to smaller and more practical legislative bodies due to be 
defined in the new constitutions. 
35. 8) As far as foreign policy is concerned, we should try to maintain the initiative. I 
consider it important for the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee to meet as 
soon as possible, perhaps even this January, and dismantle all its military structures, 
including the Joint Command, as has already been preliminarily agreed upon by the 
member states. In the spirit of the Paris Charter, we intend to bring a new quality into the 
Helsinki process. We could be well inspired by the fact that the CSCE Permanent 
Secretariat has been located in Prague. As we become integrated into the existing and 
emerging European structures, we intend, in all aspects, to coordinate our progress, 
primarily with Poland and Hungary, our closest neighbors. We believe that 
Czechoslovakia will be accepted as a fully fledged member of the Council of Europe as 
early as January or February of this year. At the same time, we hope that during this year 
we shall succeed in establishing a beneficial association treaty with the European 
Community. We make no secret of the fact that in the future we would like to join on the 
basis of equal membership. We are also seeking closer cooperation with NATO, though 
we do not intend, for the time being, to join it. 
36. Fellow citizens, 
37. It is surely no news to you if I announce that difficult times await us, and the most 
difficult of all will probably be the year beginning today. In the trials to come, however 
hard they may be, the most important thing is to not abandon hope. If we did, these trials 
would lose any meaning they have for us. They would no longer be trials, but merely 
suffering and deprivation. I firmly believe that we shall stand up well in these trials, and I 
hope we do as well as we possibly can. And that will depend on the degree of hope we 
are able to nurture in our spirits. 
38. Therefore, I am asking you to nurture this hope in yourselves and all around you 
as though it were the most vital thing you possess. 
39. Please be aware that we have already gotten rid of the evil landlord. And 
regardless of how badly the house was damaged during the long years of his rule, the 
house now belongs to us, and it is entirely up to us how we rebuild it. Therefore, I appeal 
to all of you, Czechs and Slovaks, as well as members of other ethnic groups, to respect 
our new state, to treat it as one that is genuinely our own, and to bear in mind its general 
welfare. The first major test of national coexistence in this state is over, and the Czechs 
and Slovaks have passed it. 
40. I wish all Slovaks success in building their autonomous and economically 
independent republic. I believe that this will be a republic of love and pride for all of its 
citizens. 
41. I wish the same to the Czechs. I hope that their republic will be a republic of 
wisdom and tolerance for all of its citizens. 
42. I wish all the best to all fellow countrymen, the Czechs and Slovaks living abroad. 
The time of diaspora has ended. Whether they come back home or stay in their new 
homelands, they will be welcome in our country, along with their immensely valuable 
experience and entrepreneurial spirit. 
43. I appeal to all those who, in their work, create things of value for the entire 
society. At long last, the wealth you create will be for you and your next of kin, not for 
your bailiffs or for an abstract utopian ideology. I urge all of you who quickly succeed in 
finding your place within the new economic system to sympathize with those who are 
not, initially, as lucky, and to help them as much as possible. 
44. I appeal to all who toil on the land and wish you much success in one of the oldest 
human activities. I hope that you will quickly regain your farmers' pride in the work done 
by the sweat of your brow. Our satisfaction and our well-being will depend on the 
success of your efforts. 
45. I appeal to all who have decided to take the as yet unpaved path of private 
enterprise and wish you much success in your work. I ask you not to forget that profits 
are not an end in themselves, but a means to further enhance society and its wealth, and 
to create conditions for a truly dignified and h l l  human life. 
46. I appeal to all pupils, students and young people, asking you to focus on the 
horizons that are opening up for you, and which you could only dream of a year ago. Our 
future will depend on your desire for education and moral values as well as on your 
entrepreneurial spirit. 
47. I also appeal to those who have already done most of their work for society. I 
hope that the changes you awaited or worked for so long will bring joy and satisfaction 
into your lives. We need your experience, your wisdom and your love. 
48. Dear citizens, Friends, 
49. The time of the New Year's addresses that were all alike is finally over. I am 
convinced that in my next address, the pleasant surprises will outnumber the unpleasant. I 
believe I will be able to announce that the reconstruction of our house has been 
successfully undertaken, and that its foundations are firmly laid in this land and its best 
traditions. 
50. A year ago I ended my New Year's Address by paraphrasing a well- known 
quotation from Jan Amos Komenskf: "People, your government has returned to you." 
Today I would go on to say: "It is up to you, people, to show that the return of the 
government into your own hands was not in vain." 
5 1. Happy New Year! 
